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Jinyan Li*China (People’s Rep.)
The Great Fiscal Wall of China: Tax Treaties 
and Their Role in Defining and Defending 
China’s Tax Base
By taking the Great Wall of China as an analogy 
for China’s treaty policy, the author considers 
key aspects of China’s treaty network and its 
implications, and whether or not this constitutes 
a “Great Fiscal Wall of China”.
1.  Introduction
The Great Wall is an iconic symbol of China. As a man-
made structure, the Great Wall functioned historically as a 
practical tool of defence and territorial claims. As a symbol 
of China, the Great Wall may mean different things to dif-
ferent people, ranging from a symbol of Chinese national 
identity to a witness to “a history of cultural encounters 
that have shaped modern ideas about China within the 
country as well as outside”.1 At the risk of oversimplifi-
cation, this article argues that the network of tax treaties 
functions as the Great Fiscal Wall of China, with each 
tax treaty forming the network as a point of encounter 
between the Chinese and foreign tax systems, defining the 
boundaries of the Chinese tax base (as well as the treaty 
partner’s) and defending such tax base through various 
anti-abuse rules. Although each tax treaty is different in 
some respects, the network as a whole reveals some char-
acteristics that arguably give shape to a distinct Chinese 
identity in treaty policy. 
The analogy of the treaty network to the Great Wall has 
its limitations. Unlike the Great Wall, tax treaties are not a 
“Chinese creation”. China must adopt the design and tech-
nology developed elsewhere with limited room for mod-
ification. More fundamentally, the people on the other 
side of the Great Wall were “outsiders” or “enemies”, but 
the party on the other side of a tax treaty is a “partner”. In 
addition, unlike the Great Wall, which was not intended 
to benefit any private citizens directly, tax treaties are 
designed to provide relief to taxpayers. An interesting 
twist is that taxpayers can also use the fiscal wall to shield 
their income from Chinese taxation. Metaphorically 
speaking, the fiscal wall has gates for cross-border fiscal 
travellers who can use (or abuse) a tax treaty.
* Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, Canada. The 
author can be contacted at JinyanLi@osgoode.yorku.ca.
1. C.C. Huang, Deconstructing the Great Wall of China: The Jesuits’ and British 
Encounters, in History in the Making, vol. 1, no. 165, p. 66 (2012), available 
at www.historyitm.org/index.php/hitm/article/view/76). For further 
study of the Great Wall, see J. Lovell, The Great Wall: China Against the 
World, 1000 BC – 2000 AD (Pan Macmillan Austrl. Pty, Ltd. 2007) and 
A. Waldron, The Great Wall of China: From History to Myth (Cambridge 
U. Press 1990).
In spite of the limitations in analogizing the treaty 
network as the Great Wall, such an approach serves a 
useful purpose in this article. Following this introduc-
tion, section 2. describes the development of the Great 
Fiscal Wall over the past three decades, China’s motiva-
tion for entering into tax treaties and the influence of the 
OECD Model2 and UN Model.3 Section 3. discusses the 
personal scope of tax treaties, i.e. the meaning of resident 
of a contracting state. Section 4. examines the substantive 
rules that define the scope of source-based tax jurisdiction 
over business profits, passive income (dividends, interest 
and royalties), capital gains and personal services. Section 
5. discusses the use of tax treaties as a defence mechanism 
and examines the design and application of various anti-
abuse rules. Sections 4. and 5. consider not only the provi-
sions of tax treaties, but also the administrative policy and 
practice of Chinese tax authorities. On the basis of a study 
of selected tax treaties, section 6. identifies some major 
trends in China’s treaty policy. The article concludes by 
noting some distinguishing features of the Great Fiscal 
Wall of China and speculates the implications for China 
and its treaty partners and cross-border investors. As this 
article focuses on the role of tax treaties in defining and 
defending China’s tax base, it does not discuss in any detail 
the “special provisions”, i.e. non-discrimination, mutual 
agreement procedure, exchange of information, assist-
ance in the collection of taxes, etc.
2. The OECD first published the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income 
and on Capital (30 July 1963), Models IBFD and then the OECD 
Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (1 Apr. 1977), Models 
IBFD, which was soon adopted by OECD Member countries and 
non-OECD countries in bilateral treaty negotiations. The OECD Model 
is accompanied by an article-by-article Commentary. From 1992, the 
OECD Model and Commentary were published in a loose-leaf format. 
The most recent condensed version is OECD Model Tax Convention on 
Income and on Capital (22 July 2010), Models IBFD. For a “read only” 
version, see http://fiscus.fgov.be/interfafznl/fr/downloads/ocde_en.pdf. 
The most relevant versions for China ’s treaty negotiations is the OECD 
Model (1977), although some Commentaries adopted in the 1990s, such 
as the Commentary on Article 1 in respect of improper use of tax treaties, 
appear to have had a significant effect on China ’s tax treaties and treaty 
practice.
3. The UN first published the UN Model Tax Convention on Income and 
on Capital (1 Jan. 1980), Models IBFD. The next updated version was 
the UN Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (1 Jan. 2001), 
Models IBFD, also available at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/
public/documents/un/unpan002084.pdf ) and then the UN Model Tax 
Convention on Income and on Capital (1 Jan. 2011), Models IBFD, also 
available at www.un.org/esa/ffd/documents/UN_Model_2011_Update.
pdf.
Tax Treaty Monitor
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Chile seems to be the only OECD Member country that 
does not have a treaty with China. In negotiating tax trea-
ties with many OECD Member countries, China took the 
position of a net capital-importing country and generally 
insisted on more source-based taxation and tax sparing 
in favour of China.
During the 1990s and the early 2000s, China negotiated 
tax treaties with the other BRICs, transition countries 
and many developing countries. In contrast to the OECD 
Member countries, these countries receive investment 
from China and would be expected to bargain for more 
source-based taxation and tax sparing credit from China.
From the mid 2000s to 2011, while new tax treaties were 
concluded, some earlier tax treaties were amended by way 
of protocols, for example, the tax treaties with Barbados, 
Korea (Rep.) and Mauritius, or completely renegotiated, 
for example, the tax treaties with Belgium, Finland, Sin-
gapore and the United Kingdom. Anti-abuse became a 
prominent theme in these tax treaties. The conclusion of 
tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs) was con-
sistent with this theme. China entered into TIEAs with 
some of the well-known tax havens, such as the Bahamas, 
Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, 
Guernsey, the Isle of Man and Jersey.9 It is beyond the 
scope of this article to analyse TIEAs.
2.2.  Motivation
The short time period between the promulgation of the 
first income tax laws and the conclusion of the China–
Japan Income Tax Treaty (1983) and the rapid speed in 
expanding the treaty network indicate the importance 
placed by China on tax treaties. China is presumably 
motivated to benefit from tax treaties. The most obvious 
benefits are the prevention of double taxation and fiscal 
evasion. Double taxation impedes cross-border invest-
ment, an evil that can be most effectively removed through 
tax treaties. The prevention of international fiscal evasion 
might not be a major concern in the earlier years, but argu-
ably became so when outbound investment and capital 
flight became more significant.10
During the 1980s, in addition to these tangible bene-
fits, China may have been more motivated by the poten-
tial intangible benefits that tax treaties can generate, i.e. 
the “signalling effect”. Foreign investment in China was 
inevitably accompanied by interest in China’s tax system. 
Foreign investors were naturally concerned as to how 
much Chinese tax would be imposed on the income from 
their Chinese investments, the stability of the Chinese tax 
system and the resolution of disputes with Chinese tax 
9. For more information, see the SAT website, www.chinatax.gov.cn.
10. For further discussion about why China was interested in entering tax 
treaties, see X. Jin, Perfecting Foreign Taxation and Promoting Economic
Cooperation (1986), in Selected Works on Taxation by Jin Xin, vol.1, pp. 
140-141 (China Taxn. Press 2008) (in Chinese) and Guiding Principles 
and Policies for Our Country ’s Foreign Tax System in Selected Works on 
Taxation by Jin Xin, vol. 2, pp. 640-650 (China Taxn. Press 2008) (in 
Chinese); X. Wang, Discussion of Double Taxation Prevention Treaties 
pp. 8-13 (China Fin. & Econ. Press 1887) (in Chinese); and X. Yang, 
International Coordination on Income Taxation, in International Tax Law 
2nd ed., pp. 334-336 (Beijing U. Press 2004) (in Chinese).
2.  The Great Fiscal Wall: China’s Treaty Network
2.1.  An extensive network
China’s first tax treaty was the China–Japan Income Tax 
Treaty (1983),4 concluded three years after the promul-
gation of the first income tax laws.5 By the end of 2011, 
China had developed one of the largest treaty networks in 
the world, with close to 100 tax treaties, covering OECD 
Member countries, transition countries and developing 
countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, as well as 
Hong Kong and Macau, which are Special Administra-
tive Regions of China.6
Table 1 in the Appendix lists the countries that have con-
cluded a tax treaty with China in the following six groups: 
(1) OECD Member countries; (2) the other BRIC coun-
tries (Brazil, Russia and India); (3) transition countries; 
(4) treaty haven countries, i.e. countries that are known as 
friendly jurisdictions for tax planning purposes because of 
their extensive treaty network and lower withholding tax 
rates or narrower scope of source taxation; (5) developing 
countries; and (6) Hong Kong and Macau.
Between 1983 and 2011, there appear to have been three 
phases in the development of China’s treaty network. 
Phase one was started with the China–Japan Income Tax 
Treaty (1983). Over the next five years, China had con-
cluded tax treaties with the United States (1984), France 
(1984), the United Kingdom (1984, renegotiated in 2011), 
Belgium (1985, renegotiated in 2009), Germany (1985), 
Malaysia (1985), Norway (1986), Denmark (1986), Canada 
(1986, renegotiated in 2012),7 Finland (1986, renegoti-
ated in 2010), Sweden (1986), New Zealand (1986), Thai-
land (1986), Italy (1986), Singapore (1986, renegotiated 
in 2007), the Netherlands (1987), the Czech Republic 
(1987, renegotiated in 2009),8 Poland (1988) and Austra-
lia (1988). Tax treaties with the remaining OECD Member 
countries were mostly concluded by 2000, with the excep-
tion of Greece (2002), Mexico (2005) and Israel (2010). 
4. Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the 
People ’s Republic of China for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income (6 Sept. 1983), 
Treaties IBFD.
5. CN: The Income Tax Law of the People ’s Republic of China Concerning 
Joint Ventures with Chinese and Foreign Investment adopted by National 
People ’s Congress and promulgated on 10 September 1980 (the “JVIT 
Law”). CN: Individual Income Tax Law of the People ’s Republic of China, 
National Legislation IBFD was enacted by the 3rd Session of the 5th 
National People ’s Congress and was also promulgated 10 September 
1980.
6. For further discussion of the “one country, two tax systems” as a result of 
the status of Hong Kong as a Special Administrative Region, see J. Li & D. 
Elliot, One Country, Two Tax Systems: International Taxation in Mainland 
China and Hong Kong, 57 Bull. Intl. Fiscal Docn. 4 (2003), Journals IBFD.
7. At the time of writing this article, the text of the renegotiated tax treaty 
had not been officially published.
8. The Agreement Between the Government of the People ’s Republic of China 
and the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic for the Avoidance 
of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes 
on Income (1 June 1987), Treaties IBFD continued to apply to Slovak 
Republic after 1 January 1993 when the Czech Republic and Slovak 
Republic became independent countries. A new tax treaty between China 
and the Czech Republic was concluded on 28 August 2009 (Agreement 
Between the Government of the Czech Republic and the Government of the 
People ’s Republic of China for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income (28 Aug. 2009), 
Treaties IBFD.
Jinyan Li
454 BULLETIN FOR INTERNATIONAL TAXATION SEPTEMBER 2012 © IBFD
2.3.  Technical design - the OECD and UN Models
When China decided to introduce an income tax system 
in the early 1980s as part of the economic reform pro-
gramme, it had to look to the West and to other devel-
oping countries for precedents, especially in the area of 
international taxation. When it came to tax treaties, the 
dominance of the OECD Model and UN Model was too 
obvious. China was eager to be seen as embracing the in-
ternational tax regime. Therefore, adopting the Models 
appears to be the only viable option. The only room for 
debate was the extent of using the UN Model. It took China 
about two years to negotiate the first tax treaty. Once the 
China–Japan Income Tax Treaty (1983) had been final-
ized, it became the model for tax treaties with other OECD 
Member countries and country-specific variations were 
kept at a minimum. 
Therefore, when it comes to building China’s Great Fiscal 
Wall, China used the design and technology developed by 
other countries. The OECD Model provides the structure 
and the text of a tax treaty as a starting point in negoti-
ations. The detailed OECD Commentaries worked like 
a guidebook. To the Chinese tax administration, this 
guidebook is invaluable as a learning tool and an opera-
tion manual. Recognizing the facts that the OECD Model 
works better when the two treaty countries have more or 
less equal flows of income and that China has an imbal-
anced flow with respect to OECD Member countries, 
China turned to the UN Model to deal with the imbal-
ance. The extent of reliance on the UN Model was presum-
ably influenced by China’s interest in attracting invest-
ment from the other country and in securing source-based 
taxation.
China has been recently involved in developing the OECD 
Model and the UN Model. As an OECD non-member 
country, China started participating in discussions on 
revising the OECD Model or the Commentaries on the 
OECD Model in the mid 1990s.12 Delegates from China 
served as a member of the UN Ad Hoc Group of Experts 
in the 1990s and the vice chairperson of the UN Com-
mittee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax 
Matters after 2005. As mentioned in section 6.5., China’s 
participation in these discussions appears to have served 
China well in becoming an early adopter of some innova-
tive treaty rules (mostly related to anti-abuse).
2.4.  Treaty interpretation and practice
The effect of tax treaties depends on how treaty provisions 
are interpreted and implemented in practice. In China, the 
State Administration of Taxation (SAT) is the competent 
authority and responsible for implementing tax treaties.
There is no specific law on the interpretation of tax trea-
ties. China ratified the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (the Vienna Convention) (1969)13 in 1997. The 
12. P. 427 OECD Model (2010).
13. Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969), Treaties 
IBFD, also available at http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.
aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII~1&chapter=23&Temp=mtdsg
3&lang=en.
authorities. After all, China was just beginning to learn 
how to operate a modern income tax system and how to 
interact with foreign investors after decades of isolation 
and central planning. By entering into tax treaties on the 
basis of the widely adopted models, China signalled to the 
world community that it was prepared to follow the in-
ternational tax norm. China also developed its domestic 
tax system by transplanting concepts, principles and rules, 
and by ensuring that the domestic rules are consistent with 
the treaty rules. One example is the arm’s length principle 
based on article 9 of the OECD Model.
Tax treaties were, of course, more than just signalling 
devices. They delivered substantive tax benefits to foreign 
investors. For instance, tax treaties reduced withholding 
tax rates from the domestic 20% to 15% or lower. The tax 
sparing clause in most tax treaties with OECD Member 
countries ensure the Chinese tax incentives benefit the 
investors as opposed to the treasury of the residence 
country.
From the perspective of encouraging foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI), there appears to be no disadvantage in having 
a tax treaty. While attracting FDI is important, using 
the network as a Great Fiscal Wall to define and defend 
China’s tax base might also be motivating factors. As a 
large capital importing country, China can use tax trea-
ties to clearly establish the boundaries of its tax base. This 
is particularly true in the case of tax treaties with OECD 
Member countries.
During the 1990s and early 2000s, the majority of tax trea-
ties were concluded with developing and transition coun-
tries. Arguably, treaty negotiations were motivated by 
China’s interest in promoting Chinese outbound invest-
ment.11 Tax treaties are expected to protect China’s tax 
base as a residence country and to prevent double taxa-
tion. These tax treaties serve slightly different functions 
than those with OECD Member countries, as China is 
more likely to be an exporter of FDI to the treaty partner 
countries. As such, China might take the stance that is nor-
mally taken by OECD Member countries. On the other 
hand, being a developing country, China might be more 
sympathetic to the concerns of capital importing coun-
tries and be willing to concede to more source-based taxa-
tion than a typical OECD Member country.
Recently, China has started renegotiating some of the tax 
treaties with capital exporting countries, while continu-
ing expanding its treaty network to countries in Africa, 
Asia and Latin America. The renegotiated tax treaties with 
Belgium, Finland, Singapore and the United Kingdom 
have a strong emphasis on anti-avoidance provisions, 
less emphasis on source-based taxation, and the elimina-
tion of tax sparing. These features reflect the stance of a 
more “mature” tax system. The signalling effect, therefore, 
appears to be less important.
11. China ’s outbound investment was located in 132 countries in 2011. 
See Invest in China, Summary of China ’s Outbound Non-financial 
Investment in 2011, available at www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI/wztj/jwtztj/
t20120119_140581.htm.
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personal opinions in the interpretation of treaty provi-
sions.25 The level of expertise at local levels varies greatly, 
which may result in inconsistent interpretations across 
the country.26
On the basis of the SAT interpretation circulars, it appears 
that the SAT’s approach is consistent with article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention, i.e. “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light 
of its object and purpose”. The SAT has rejected the highly 
textual and/or literal approach in favour of the substance-
over-form doctrine.
2.5.  Assessing the trends and policy framework
Now that China’s treaty network appears to be well 
established, it is a good time to assess the major trends in 
China’s treaty policy. As all of the tax treaties are based 
on the OECD Model and incorporate some provisions of 
the UN Model, the trends are assessed by identifying the 
differences between tax treaties and trying to make some 
sense of the differences.27
For this purpose, countries are considered in the follow-
ing five groups: (1) OECD Member countries; (2) transi-
tion countries; (3) treaty heaven countries; (4) developing 
countries; and (5) countries with a renegotiated tax treaty 
with China (see Table 2 in the Appendix). The research 
does not cover each and every tax treaty due to time con-
straints. The selected tax treaties are representative of the 
types of countries and the time of conclusion of the tax 
treaty. Renegotiated tax treaties are analysed as a separate 
group in order to capture the changes in China’s treaty 
policy from the first decade to the third decade. In addi-
tion, in order to assess the role of Hong Kong as a gateway 
for investment (inbound and outbound), Hong Kong’s 
tax treaties are also examined at the end of this article (see 
section 5.8.).
This study is also limited to selected provisions that are 
more telling of China’s major policy concerns about 
the taxation of business profits, investment income and 
capital gains, double taxation relief, and miscellaneous 
provisions. Table 3 in the Appendix summarizes these 
provisions in the UN Model. With regard to business 
profits, the study focuses on the incorporation of articles 
5 and 7 of the UN Model in respect of the meaning of the 
term “permanent establishment” relating to construction 
sites, the provision of services, the activities of agents and 
limitations on the deduction of expenses in determining 
the amount of profits attributable to the PE. With regard 
to investment income, capital gains and other income, the 
study focuses on provisions in the UN Model that deviate 
from the OECD Model, such as the rate of withholding 
taxes, the source-country taxation of gains derived from 
25. F. Cao, Corporate Income Tax Law and Practice in the People ’s Republic of 
China, p. 268 (Oxford U. Press 2011).
26. Id.
27. For further discussion of China ’s tax treaties, see B. Arnold & J. Li, China ’s 
Tax Treaty Policy, in China Tax Reform Options p. 78 (T. Fulton, J. Li & D. 
Xu eds., World Scientific 1998) and M. Lang, J. Liu & G. Tang, Europe–
China Tax Treaties (Kluwer L. Intl. 2010).
interpretation principles provided in articles 31 and 32 of 
the Vienna Convention apply in China. The most influ-
ential circular on treaty interpretation, Guoshuifa [2010] 
No. 75 or the Treaty Interpretation Circular,14 cited the 
Vienna Convention (1969) in the preamble. Article 3(2) 
of the OECD Model, which governs the interpretation of 
undefined terms in a tax treaty, has been incorporated into 
China’s tax treaties so that the domestic law meaning of an 
undefined term applies for treaty interpretation purposes 
as long as it is consistent with the context of the tax treaty.
Chinese tax law clearly provides that in the case of any 
inconsistency between domestic law and the provisions of 
a treaty, the treaty prevails.15 The official texts of China’s 
tax treaties are generally in Chinese, the language of the 
treaty partner and English. In the event of interpretative 
disputes, the English text generally prevails.
The SAT has the general power to interpret tax legislation 
and tax treaties. The positions stated in the SAT circulars 
are rarely contradicted by court decisions. There appears 
to have been only one court decision on treaty interpre-
tation, which contains minimal reasoning and analysis.16
The SAT has published a number of circulars on the 
meaning of certain treaty provisions, such as residence,17 
permanent establishment (PE),18 beneficial ownership,19 
arm’s length principle20 and procedures for claiming treaty 
benefits.21 In most cases, these administrative pronounce-
ments are not treaty-specific. In cases where a circular22 
interprets a specific tax treaty, for example, the China–
Singapore Income Tax Treaty (2007),23 the interpretative 
guidelines are taken to have a more generic application. 
OECD Commentaries, OECD Transfer Pricing Guide-
lines24 and other reports, and foreign practices and case 
law, although not explicitly cited as authorities, appear 
to have influenced the SAT’s interpretation of China’s 
tax treaties. In practice, some SAT officials often use the 
OECD Commentaries as a reference when giving their 
14. SAT, Guoshuifa [2010] No. 75, The Interpretation of Provisions of 
Agreement Between the Government of the People ’s Republic of China and 
the Government of the Republic of Singapore for the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on 
Income and Its Protocols.
15. See CN: Enterprise Income Tax of the People ’s Republic of China art. 58 
(promulgated at the 5th session of the 10th National People ’s Congress of 
China on 16 March 2007 and issued by Order of President No. 63 on 16 
March 2007) (the “EIT Law”). CN: Implementation Regulations for the 
Enterprise Income Tax Law of the People ’s Republic of China, National 
Legislation IBFD was promulgated by State Council on 28 November 
2007 and issued by the Order of the State Council No. 512 on 6 December 
2007 (the “EIT Regulations”).
16. CN: BFIPC, 2001, PanAm SAT International Systems, Inc. v. Beijing State
Tax Bureau. For a brief discussion of this case, see sec. 4.4.4.
17. See sec. 3.3. and 3.4.
18. See sec. 4.3.2.
19. See sec. 5.5.
20. See sec. 5.4.
21. See sec. 3.4.
22. SAT, Guoshuifa [2010] No. 75, supra n. 14.
23. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Singapore and the 
Government of the People ’s Republic of China for the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on 
Income (11 July 2007), Treaties IBFD [hereinafter: P.R.C.–Sing. Income 
and Capital Tax Treaty].
24. OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and 
Tax Administrations (OECD 2010), International Organizations’ 
Documentation IBFD.
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than one year.32 For this purpose, an individual is con-
sidered to have a domicile in China if he or she habit-
ually resides in China due to registered permanent resi-
dence, family or economic ties.33 The tax law concept of 
“domicile” is tied to citizenship or immigration status. 
Chinese citizens are subject to a household registration 
system, which records the “official” address of each citizen. 
Chinese citizens who are absent from China for a signifi-
cant period of time for various reasons are often regarded 
as domiciled in China for tax purposes, even though no 
serious attempts have been made by the Chinese tax 
authorities to actually tax their foreign income.34 Non-
Chinese citizens living in China are domiciled in China 
if they receive a permanent residence status, a privilege 
infrequently bestowed. The full-year physical presence 
test means that a person stays in China for more than a 
year, ignoring temporary absences from China (no more 
than 30 days per absence or no more than 90 days of total 
absences during the year).
Corporations are liable to comprehensive tax liability in 
China if they are incorporated in China or have a place of 
effective management in China.35 Chinese-incorporated 
companies typically include domestic enterprises, such as 
state-owned enterprises, collectively owned enterprises, 
privately owned enterprises, and foreign-investment en-
terprises, such as joint venture companies and wholly for-
eign-owned enterprises. Irrespective of the location of the 
place of management, these domestic-incorporated com-
panies are residents in China and taxable on their world-
wide income.
The place-of-effective-management test becomes rel-
evant when a company is incorporated outside China 
(offshore company). Under Chinese domestic law, the 
term “place of effective management” refers to “the place 
that executes substantial and overall management and 
control over the production and business operations, 
personnel, finance, properties and other matters”.36 This 
test has become increasingly important in determining 
the Chinese residence of offshore companies that are con-
trolled by Chinese investors. These offshore entities are 
often used as vehicles to raise capital, directly or indirectly, 
by holding shares of a public company whose shares are 
traded at a stock exchange (typically in Hong Kong or the 
United States).
Some offshore companies opt for the Chinese residence 
status to minimize their tax liability. For instance, divi-
dends paid to Chinese investors would be tax exempt in 
China if the payer and the recipient of the dividends are 
both residents of China. A company can also rely on the 
Chinese tax treaties to reduce withholding taxes on invest-
32. Art. 1 EIT Law.
33. Art. 2 EIT Regulations.
34. W. Cui, The Impact of the OECD and UN Model Conventions on China ’s 
Tax Treaties, p. 2 (2011), available at http://works.bepress.com/wei_cui/8.
35. Art. 2 EIT Law. See J. Li, Fundamental Enterprise Income Tax Reform in 
China: Motivations and Major Changes, 61 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 12 (2007), 
Journals IBFD and J. Li & H. Huang, Transformation of the Enterprise 
Income Tax: Internationalization and Chinese Innovations, 62 Bull. Intl. 
Taxn. (2008), Journals IBFD.
36. Art. 4 EIT Regulations.
the alienation of shares and other income. Anti-abuse 
rules covered by this study include the beneficial owner-
ship rule, the arm’s length principle, the limitation on ben-
efits (LOB) provision, the general anti-treaty abuse rule 
and the domestic general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR). 
3.  Claimants of Treaty Benefits: The Meaning of
“Resident”
3.1.  “Person”
China’s tax treaties typically cover persons who are resi-
dents of China and/or the other treaty country. A person 
is defined to include “an individual, a company and any 
other body of persons”. A “company” means “any body 
corporate or any entity that is treated as a body corporate 
for tax purposes”.
According to Chinese domestic law, “individuals” are tax 
units under the Individual Income Tax Law and enter-
prises are tax units under the Enterprise Income Tax (EIT) 
Law (2007). The meaning of “enterprise” is much broader 
than that of a “company” to include for-profit and non-
profit entities, but not partnerships and sole proprietor-
ships.28 Other entities include social organizations, asso-
ciations, foundations, etc.29
For treaty purposes, the SAT interprets the term “person” 
to have the meaning of “enterprise” under domestic law. 
Partnerships are not “persons”, but associations and foun-
dations, such as charitable organizations and pension 
funds, are. A trust is not taxed as a separate entity under 
Chinese law, but it can qualify as a “person” if the law of the 
treaty partner country taxes the trust as a separate entity.30
3.2.  Liable to tax
The meaning of the term “resident of a Contracting State” 
in China’s tax treaties is generally based on article 4(1) 
of the OECD Model, i.e. any person who, under the laws 
of that sate, is liable to tax therein on the basis of criteria 
such as domicile, residence, place of head office, place of 
incorporation or any other criterion of a similar nature.
The meaning of “residence” is, therefore, derived from 
domestic law. The phrase “liable to tax” is interpreted by 
the SAT to mean “having the legal obligation to pay tax on 
a comprehensive basis,” but “not actual payment of tax”.31 
Charitable organizations, foundations and pension funds 
that are exempt from tax under domestic law are regarded 
as entities that are liable to tax and, therefore, qualify as 
“residents” for treaty purposes. Similarly, a company that 
pays no income tax because of tax incentives or loss carry-
overs is undeniably “resident” for treaty purposes.
3.3.  Resident of China
Under Chinese domestic law, the basis for determining 
an individual’s comprehensive, worldwide, tax liability is 
either domicile or physical presence in China for more 
28. Art. 2 EIT Law.
29. Arts. 2 and 3 EIT Regulations.
30. Art. 3 Guoshuifa [2010] No. 75, supra n. 14.
31. Id., art. 4.
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by paragraph 24 of the OECD Commentary on Article 4 
of the OECD Model (2010):43
The place of effective management is the place where key man-
agement and commercial decisions that are necessary for the con-
duct of the entity’s business as a whole are in substance made. All 
relevant facts and circumstances must be examined to determine 
the place of effective management.
The issue of dual residence is resolved through tiebreakers 
that are based on the OECD Model. In the case of individ-
uals, these tests are permanent home, centre of vital inter-
ests, habitual abode, nationality and competent authori-
ties. In the case of corporations, the tiebreaker is either 
the place of effective management or the place of the head 
office. The SAT interpretation of the tiebreakers is gener-
ally consistent with the OECD Commentary on Article 4.44
3.4.  Resident of the other contracting state
In order to apply for treaty benefits, a non-resident tax-
payer must provide the local tax authorities in China with 
a residence certificate issued by the competent authority 
of the other Contracting State.45 The SAT has a standard 
format for proving Chinese residence.46
As discussed further in section 5.2., possessing a tax resi-
dence certificate in a treaty partner country is not a guar-
antee for enjoying the benefits of the tax treaty. Treaty 
benefits may be denied in the case of treaty shopping or 
other “abuse” situations.47
4.  Defining China’s Tax Base
4.1.  Introductory remarks
Tax treaties allocate the jurisdiction to tax business profits, 
investment income and personal income between the two 
countries. Treaty language is neutral and applies to both 
countries without discrimination. Either country can be 
the source country or the residence country in respect of 
a specific item of income. In effect, however, because of 
the imbalance in the flows of income between China and 
its treaty partner, China is either a predominantly “source 
country” or a “residence country”. 
This section examines how tax treaties define and limit 
the source country’s tax jurisdiction over business profits, 
investment income, capital gains and personal services 
income. The emphasis is on identifying and exploring 
the extent to which the UN Model is incorporated into 
these tax treaties. To that end, the discussion of each sub-
sequent topic generally begins with a summary of the per-
tinent provision in the Models, the major differences, if 
any, between the Models, the incorporation of the provi-
sion in Chinese tax treaties and concludes with an over-
view of the treaty practice in China.
43. OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Commentary on 
Article 4 (22 July 2010), Models IBFD.
44. Art. 4 Guoshuifa [2010] No. 75, supra n. 14.
45. SAT, Guoshuihan [2009] No. 395, Notice on Printing the Samples of
Resident Certificates of Some Countries and Regions (24 July 2009).
46. SAT, Guoshuihan, [2008] No. 829, Notice on Carrying out the Work of 
Issuing China Tax Residence Certificate.
47. See secs. 5.5. and 5.6.
ment received from third countries. This has reportedly 
occurred in the case of China Unicom (HK) Ltd., which 
received a tax refund from Spain under the China–Spain 
Income and Capital Tax Treaty (1990).37 China Unicom 
(HK) Ltd. was a listed company in Hong Kong, but had 
its management and control in China. It held shares in a 
Spanish company and received dividends. On the basis of 
the tax treaty, China Unicom (HK) Ltd. claimed a refund 
of the withholding tax that was withheld at the domes-
tic rate (there was no tax treaty between Hong Kong and 
Spain).38
Some other offshore companies prefer to avoid Chinese 
residence to minimize Chinese tax. This is presumably 
the case where the offshore company does not distribute 
much of its profits to the shareholders and is not subject 
to the Chinese controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules 
which impute the profits to Chinese resident sharehold-
ers.39
The SAT provides the following four criteria for deter-
mining if the place of effective management is in China:40
(1) senior management and senior management depart-
ments that are responsible for daily production, oper-
ation and management of the corporation perform 
their duties mainly within China;
(2) financial decisions (such as money borrowing, 
lending, financing and financial risk management) 
and personnel decisions (such as appointment, dis-
missal, salary and wages) are made or need to be 
approved by organizations or persons located within 
China;
(3) main property, accounting books, corporate seal 
and records of meetings of the board of directors 
and shareholders of the corporation are located in 
China; and
(4) one half or more of the members of the board of 
directors or the senior management staff of the cor-
poration habitually reside in China.
These criteria are assessed in accordance with the sub-
stance-over-form principle.41 If all of the criteria are met, 
the place of effective management is in China. An offshore 
corporation can voluntarily report its Chinese residence 
status. Otherwise, it may be assessed as such and required 
to pay Chinese tax as a resident.42 The SAT approach to 
determining corporate residence is presumably inspired 
37. Agreement Between the Government of Spain and the Government of the 
People ’s Republic of China for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital 
(22 Nov. 1990), Treaties IBFD.
38. See Hundreds of Millions of Tax Refund to China from Spain Because of the 
Treaty Benefits, available at www.chinaacc.com/new/253_258_201109/0
5wa1069423316.shtml (in Chinese).
39. Art. 45 EIT Law.
40. SAT, Guoshuifa [2009] No. 82, art. 2.
41. Id., art. 3.
42. SAT Public Bulletin, 2001, No. 45, Measures on the Administration of 
Tax Matters Regarding Offshore Companies Controlled by Chinese 
Enterprises.
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is wholly or partly carried on”. It is found in China’s tax 
treaties.
The SAT Treaty Interpretation Circular provides the fol-
lowing guidance on the interpretation of this provision: 
(1) the physical place of business can be owned or rented 
by the enterprise; and (2) it can be an office, a branch, a 
hotel room, or equipment, a warehouse, a site or a retail 
stall in a shopping mall. The place of business must be 
fixed and its existence has a sense of permanence. The 
notion of “fixed” encompasses activities conducted at 
several locations within a geographical proximity. For 
instance, when an enterprise uses several rooms in the 
same hotel, the hotel can be regarded as a fixed place or, 
when an enterprise sets up several booths in the same 
marketplace, the marketplace may be regarded as a fixed 
place of business.51 The temporal permanence of a place 
of business is not affected by temporary suspension of the 
business. In other words, a place of business qualifies as 
a PE when it is intended to be “permanent”, but was ter-
minated due to failure in business after a short period of 
time in operation. In addition, when a place of business 
is created for a temporary purpose, but ends up having a 
longer existence, it is regarded as a PE.
The SAT broadly interprets the phrase “the business of an 
enterprise is wholly or partly carried on” through the fixed 
place of business, i.e. “any circumstances where the enter-
prise carries on activities at any location at its disposal”.52 
The SAT provides the following two examples: (1) if the 
enterprise signs contracts with customers in China and 
the contracts are performed at a place of business in China, 
the enterprise is considered to be carrying on business 
through the place; and (2) if the place makes substantial 
contributions to the relationship between the enterprise 
and its Chinese clients, even if the contract is concluded 
directly by the enterprise and the client, the enterprise is 
considered to be carrying on its business through the place 
of business in China.
4.3.2.2.  Fixed place of business
Article 5(2) of the OECD Model and UN Model pro-
vides the following non-exhaustive list of examples of 
fixed places of business as PEs: a place of management; 
a branch; an office; a factory; a workshop; and a mine, an 
oil or gas well, a quarry or any other place of extraction of 
natural resources. 
Article 5(2) is generally found in Chinese tax treaties. The 
SAT Treaty Interpretation Circular clarifies that “a place 
of management” within the meaning of article 5 is differ-
ent from the “place of effective management” for the pur-
poses of determining corporate residence. Specifically, it 
refers to a representative office that represents the enter-
prise in taking some management functions and these 
functions are not the same as those performed by the 
head office. “A mine, an oil or gas well, a quarry or other 
place of extraction of natural resources” is limited to situ-
ations where the enterprise has made investment and has 
51. Art. 5 Guoshuifa [2010] No. 75, supra n. 14.
52. Id.
4.2.  “China”
For the purposes of tax treaties, “China” is defined as the 
territory in which Chinese laws are effectively in force. 
This is a subtle way of indicating that, at present, China 
refers to “Mainland China”. China’s existing tax treaties 
do not apply to Hong Kong, Macau or Taiwan.
Chinese domestic tax laws regard Hong Kong, Macau and 
Taiwan as foreign jurisdictions and treat residents in these 
three regions as “non-residents” of China. In fact, China 
has entered into a “tax arrangement” with Macau and 
Hong Kong48 that is similar to the standard tax treaties.49
4.3.  Business profits
4.3.1.  Overview
China’s tax treaties generally follow the principle codified 
in article 7(1) of the OECD Model and UN Model, i.e. busi-
ness profits of an enterprise resident in a treaty country 
are taxed in the other country only where the enterprise 
carries on business in that country through a PE and the 
profits are attributable to the PE. This principle is subject 
to two notable exceptions. First, business profits in the 
form of income from immovable property are taxable in 
the country in the source country, i.e. where the property 
is located (article 6 of the OECD Model and UN Model). 
Second, business profits of international shipping and air 
transportation enterprises are taxable exclusively in the 
residence country (article 8 of the OECD Model and UN 
Model). The rationale underlying these two exceptions 
applies to the gains realized from the disposal of shares 
of companies whose value is derived principally from 
immovable property and shares of international trans-
portation companies (see section 4.4.5.).
The application of article 7 is supported by three other 
provisions: (1) article 5 defines the scope of a PE; (2) article 
9 provides for the arm’s length principle that governs the 
attribution of profits to a PE; and (3) article 14 deals with a 
specific type of business profits, i.e. income from indepen-
dent services, which has been removed from the OECD 
Model (2000),50 but remains in China’s tax treaties. Table 
4 in the Appendix shows the incorporation of articles 5 
and 7 of the UN Model in Chinese tax treaties.
4.3.2.  PEs
4.3.2.1.  General definition
Article 5(1) of the two Models is identical in defining the 
term “permanent establishment” to mean “a fixed place 
of business through which the business of an enterprise 
48. The Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People ’s Republic of 
China on the Question of Hong Kong, the “Hong Kong Agreement” signed 
in September 1984, following extensive negotiations between the Chinese 
and British governments. The Hong Kong Agreement sets out the basis 
on which Hong Kong will be returned to Chinese sovereignty in 1997.
49. A similar arrangement has been negotiated with Taiwan, but, at the time 
of the writing of this article, had not yet been published.
50. OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (29 Apr. 2000), 
Models IBFD.
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Examples include separate contracts for different types of 
projects on a construction site or the highway construc-
tion project that changes the site with the progression of 
the work.
For the purposes of article 5(3), the services of an enter-
prise may be provided by an employee or other personnel 
engaged by the enterprise who perform services under the 
control and direction of the enterprise.56 The SAT Treaty 
Interpretation Circular interprets services to include engi-
neering, technical, management, design, training and con-
sulting. In measuring the time period, for example, six 
months or 183 days, the clock starts on the date when the 
employees first arrive in China and stops when the project 
is completed and ready for use by the client, but include 
only the days when the employees are actually in China. 
When there are multiple employees working on the con-
tract concurrently, the counting is based on the number 
of days, irrespective of the number of employees working 
in China. For instance, an enterprise may have 10 em-
ployees working in China for 20 days without giving rise 
to a PE, but an enterprise having one employee working 
in China for 200 days does. The period or periods for 
the same project or a connected project are aggregated. 
The SAT considers the following three factors relevant to 
determine if projects are connected: (1) whether they are 
included in a master contract; (2) if the projects are gov-
erned by different contracts, whether those contracts are 
signed by the same or related enterprises and whether the 
implementation of the first project is the prerequisite con-
dition for the implementation of the second project; and 
(3) whether the nature of those projects is the same and 
whether those projects are performed by the same people.
4.3.2.4.  Preparatory and auxiliary activities
Preparatory and auxiliary activities carried out by an 
enterprise through a fixed place of business or agents do 
not give rise to a PE under either the OECD Model or the 
UN Model. The two Models differ, however, in dealing 
with the use of facilities or the maintenance of stock for 
the purpose of delivery of goods or merchandise, i.e. such 
activity constitutes a PE under the UN Model, but not 
under the OECD Model. 
China’s tax treaties generally follow the OECD Model.57 
According to Guoshuifa [2010] No. 75,58 places used to 
carry out preparatory and auxiliary activities generally 
have the following characteristics:
 – There are no independent business activities per-
formed in the place. The activities performed do not 
constitute an essential or key part of the enterprise’s 
business activities as a whole.
 – The activities are those listed in the tax treaty and 
are performed only for the enterprise and not for any 
other enterprises.
56. Id., art. 5(3).
57. See Ecker & Tang, supra n. 54, at p. 62.
58. Art. 5(4) Guoshuifa [2010] No. 75, supra n. 14.
obtained the right to extract and operate the resources. It 
does not include situations where an enterprise is engaged 
to provide contractual engineering services to explore or 
develop natural resources.53
4.3.2.3.  Contract engineering and services
Article 5(3) of the UN Model differs from the OECD 
Model in two respects. The OECD Model contains one 
paragraph, stating that a “building site or construction 
or installation project constitutes a permanent establish-
ment only if it lasts more than twelve months”. The UN 
broadens the PE definition by providing that a PE also 
encompasses:
(1) a building site, a construction, assembly or installa-
tion project if the activities last more than six months;
(2) the rule in (1) also applies to supervisory activities 
in connection with a building site, a construction, 
assembly or installation project; and
(3) the “furnishing of services, including consultancy ser-
vices, by an enterprise through employees or other 
personnel engaged by the enterprise for such purpose, 
but only if activities of that nature continue (for the 
same or a connected project) within a Contracting 
State for a period or periods aggregating more than 
183 days in any 12-month period commencing or 
ending in the fiscal year concerned”.
China’s tax treaties generally follow the UN Model (see 
Table 4 in the Appendix), although the time period may 
vary from six months to nine months, three months or 
even twelve months in some tax treaties.54 In terms of 
measuring the time period for the activities in connection 
with a building site, construction, assembly or installation 
project (referred to as “contractual engineering activities” 
in the Treaty Interpretation Circular) or related supervi-
sory activities, the SAT takes the position that the period 
begins on the firstdate of implemention of the contract 
(including preparation work) and ends on the date when 
the project is completed and ready for use (including 
trial operation). Once the clock starts, it does not stop to 
account for the pause of work due to the lack of equip-
ment, materials or bad weather.
If a main contractor subcontracts part of its work to a sub-
contractor, the time of the subcontractor is treated as part 
of the time for the main contractor. Supervisory activities 
of a general contractor generally include the work per-
formed by a subcontractor as well as by an independent 
project supervision contractor.55 If an enterprise under-
takes two or more contractual projects at one work site in 
China and these projects are commercially and geographi-
cally connected to form a whole project, these contracts 
should be aggregated and the time period for the whole 
project should begin from the commencement of the first 
contract and end on the completion of the last project. 
53. Id.
54. For an overview of China ’s tax treaties with European countries, see T. 
Ecker & J. Tang, Business Profits (Articles 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 14 OECD Model), 
in Lang, Liu & Tang, supra n. 27, at pp. 33-78.
55. Guoshuifa [2010] No. 75, supra n. 14. A separate PE may exist for the 
independent supervision contractor, depending on the period of time of 
its activities in China. 
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nomically independent. The independence of an agent 
is determined by considering three questions: (1) is the 
agent independent in conducting business activities?, i.e. 
if the principal provides specific instructions and exercises 
overall control over the activities of the agent, the agent is 
not independent; (2) who bears the commercial risk?, i.e. if 
the risk is borne by the principal, the agent is not indepen-
dent; and (3) how many principals does the agent have?, 
i.e. if the agent represents only one enterprise during a sig-
nificant period of time, then the agent is not independent.
4.3.2.6.  Subsidiary as PE
A subsidiary of a company does not, on its own, consti-
tute a PE for the parent under both Models (article 5(7) 
of the OECD Model and article 5(8) of the UN Model). 
China’s tax treaties contain this provision. In determining 
whether the activities of a subsidiary constitute a PE for 
its parent, Guoshuifa [2010] No. 75 looks at whether the 
personnel seconded to the subsidiary are under the direc-
tion and control of the subsidiary or whether the subsid-
iary acts as an agent for the parent. Seconded employees 
from the parent may be considered to be working for the 
parent, not the subsidiary, if one of the following condi-
tions is met:60
 – the parent has control over these employees and bears 
the related risk and responsibilities;
 – the parent decides the number and qualifications of 
these employees;
 – the parent bears the cost of compensation; or
 – the parent earns profits by sending these people to 
work at the subsidiary. 
The Circular does not mention the period of time required 
for the employees to work in China to satisfy the PE test.
4.3.3.  Attribution of profits to a PE
4.3.3.1.  Introductory remarks
Both Models contain a basic principle for attributing 
business profits to a PE, i.e. business profits derived by 
an enterprise resident in a contracting state through a PE 
in another contracting state are taxable to the extent of 
profits attributable to the PE. The UN Model deviates 
from the OECD Model in several respects to broaden the 
tax base of the source country.
4.3.3.2.  Profits attributable to a PE
Under article 7(1) of the UN Model, the attributable 
profits also include the profits that are attributable to the 
“sales in that other State of goods or merchandise of the 
same or similar kinds as those sold through the perma-
nent establishment”, or “other business activities carried 
on in that other State of the same or similar kind as those 
effected through that permanent establishment”. In other 
words, the UN Model contains a limited force of attrac-
tion.
60. Id., art. 5(7). The services fees paid by the subsidiary to the parent must 
be reasonable to be deductible to the subsidiary.
 – The responsibility is limited to the nature of routine 
activities, not activities that directly generate busi-
ness profits. The key is to determine if the activity is 
auxiliary to the main business activity or is the busi-
ness proper. For instance, purchasing activities may 
be auxiliary if the purchasing is for the enterprise, but, 
if the procurement is for the clients of the enterprise, 
the activities in China are of the business proper, not 
auxiliary within the meaning of article 5(4).
4.3.2.5.  Agents and insurance premiums
In addition to a “fixed place of business”, both Models 
deem an agent to constitute a PE under certain conditions. 
In the case of a dependent agent, a key condition is that 
the agent “has, and habitually exercises, in a Contracting 
State an authority to conclude contracts in the name of 
the enterprise”. Both Models provide that independent 
agents are not deemed to be a PE. The UN Model devi-
ates from the OECD Model in three respects and deems 
an agent to be a PE where: (1) a person without the au-
thority to conclude contracts in the name of the enterprise 
is nonetheless considered to be a dependent agent if that 
person “habitually maintains a stock of goods or merchan-
dise from which he regularly delivers goods or merchan-
dise on behalf of the enterprise” (article 5(5)(b) of the UN 
Model); (2) an independent agent is considered not to be 
independent when his/her activities are devoted wholly or 
almost wholly on behalf of one enterprise (article 5(7) of 
the UN Model); and (3) an insurance company collecting 
premiums in another state is deemed to have a PE in that 
other state under article 5(6) of the UN Model.
China’s tax treaties do not universally follow the UN 
Model. In fact, article 5(6) of the UN Model is rarely 
adopted in tax treaties with OECD Member countries, 
let alone those with transition and developing countries 
(see Table 4 in the Appendix).
The SAT interpretation of agency PE is governed by the 
substance-over-form principle. The “authority to con-
clude contracts” means not only “signing” contracts, but 
also “participating in contractual negotiations and discus-
sion of contractual terms”.59 For this purpose, “contracts” 
refer to those relating to the business of the enterprise, and 
not contracts dealing with internal affairs of the enter-
prise, such as employment contracts. The term “habitually 
exercise” does not necessarily mean the frequency of par-
ticipation in negotiations or the number of contracts con-
cluded. Its meaning in a given situation depends on the 
nature of the contract involved, the nature of the business 
of the enterprise and the frequency of the agent’s activi-
ties. Some contracts require extensive, time-consuming 
negotiations (such as the purchase of airplanes and ship-
ping vessels) and the conclusion of a single contract may 
give rise to a PE.
In determining whether or not an agent is an indepen-
dent agent whose activities do not give rise to a PE for the 
principal, the SAT requires the agent be legally and eco-
59. Id., art. 5(5).
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4.3.3.4.  Limitations on deduction
Article 7(3) of the Models contains rules for allowable 
deductions and the UN Model is more restrictive. The 
pre-2010 OECD Model provides that:
there shall be allowed as deductions expenses which are incurred 
for the purposes of the business of the permanent establishment 
including executive and general administrative expenses so in-
curred, whether in the State in which the permanent establish-
ment is situated or elsewhere.
The UN Model continues with a prohibition of any deduc-
tion for expenses, other than reimbursement of actual ex-
penses, paid by the PE to its head office by way of: (1) roy-
alties, fees or other similar payments in return for the use 
of patents or other intangibles; (2) management fees and 
other fees for services; and (3) interest, except where the 
enterprise is a bank.64 Intuitively, these prohibitions con-
tradict the principle of treating each PE as an independent 
enterprise dealing at arm’s length with its head office, but 
do serve the purpose of attributing more profits to a PE, 
thereby broadening the tax base of the source country that 
would otherwise be the case under the OECD Model.
China’s tax treaties with OECD countries generally incor-
porate article 7(3) of the UN Model, but tax treaties with 
transition countries or developing countries generally do 
not.65 The SAT Treaty Interpretation Circular reiterates 
the principle that all expenses incurred for the purpose of 
the PE, irrespective of where the expenses are incurred, are 
deductible in computing the profits of a PE. The deduct-
ible expenses include those that are not directly related 
to the PE, but are general and administrative expenses 
allocated to the PE by the head office. However, the ex-
penses that are allocated to the PE must be incurred for 
the purpose of the PE and the amount must be reasonable. 
The enterprise is required to prove the reasonableness of 
the amounts by providing information on the scope and 
amount of the total expenses and the basis and method-
ology for allocation.
4.3.3.5.  Deemed profits or apportionment of profits
Article 7(4) and 7(5) of the two Models are identical. 
Article 7(4) allows the determination of the profits attrib-
utable to a PE on the basis of an apportionment of the total 
profits of the enterprise to its various parts insofar as it 
has been customary to use the apportionment method in 
the contracting state and the method is used in accord-
ance with the principles contained in article 7. Article 7(5) 
requires that the same method be used year by year, unless 
there is a good and sufficient reason to the contrary.
64. Art. 7(3) of the UN Model also states that “no account shall be taken, in the 
determination of the profits of a permanent establishment, for amounts 
charged (otherwise than towards reimbursement of actual expenses), by 
the permanent establishment to the head office of the enterprise or any 
of its other offices, by way of royalties, fees or other similar payments in 
return for the use of patents or other rights, or by way of commission for 
specific services performed or for management, or, except in the case of 
a banking enterprise by way of interest on moneys lent to the head office 
of the enterprise or any of its other offices”.
65. Ecker & Tang, supra n. 54, at pp. 40-43.
China’s tax treaties do not contain such force of attrac-
tion principle.61 The SAT interprets “profits attributable 
to a PE” to include not only the profits derived by the PE 
from Chinese sources, but also income earned from both 
inside or outside China that is effectively connected to the 
PE, such as dividends, interest, rent and royalties.62 The 
term “effectively connected” means that there is an owner-
ship or effective management relationship in respect of the 
underlying equity, debt, industrial property or equipment.
Article 7(5) of the OECD Model further clarifies that no 
profits are attributed to a PE by reason of the mere pur-
chase by that PE of goods or merchandise for the enter-
prise. This provision is missing in the UN Model as the 
UN Ad Hoc Expert Group saw no need in including such 
provision:63
Since under Article 5 an office or facility maintained by an en-
terprise in a Contracting State in the other Contracting State for 
mere purchase of goods or merchandise does not constitute a 
permanent establishment, there would be very few cases where an 
enterprise having a permanent establishment dealing with other 
business would also have a purchasing facility for the enterprise.
China’s tax treaties generally contain article 7(5) of the 
OECD Model. The SAT Treaty Interpretation Circular 
reiterates the point that this rule applies only to the pur-
chase of goods or merchandise for the enterprise and any 
expenses incurred by the PE in respect of such purchas-
ing activities are not deductible in computing the profits 
attributable to the PE. If the only activities of the place of 
business of an enterprise are the purchasing of goods or 
merchandise for the enterprise, there is no PE, therefore, 
no need to apply article 7.
4.3.3.3.  Distinct and separate entity
Article 7(2) of the two Models is identical, providing that 
central principle in attributing profits to a PE, i.e. the 
profits attributable to a PE are the profits which the PE 
might be expected to make “if it were a distinct and sepa-
rate enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities 
under the same or similar conditions and dealing wholly 
independently with the enterprise of which it is a perma-
nent establishment”. This provision extends the arm’s 
length principle to the attribution of profits by deeming 
a PE to be a distinct enterprise dealing at arm’s length with 
the enterprise and other PEs of the enterprise.
China’s tax treaties contain article 7(2). The SAT Treaty 
Interpretation Circular recognizes the importance of the 
arm’s length principle in attributing profits to a PE and 
expects fair market prices to be used in determining the 
profits derived by a PE from transactions with the enter-
prise and other PEs of the enterprise.
61. Ecker & Tang, supra n. 54, at p. 35.
62. Art. 7(1) Guoshuifa [2010] No. 75, supra n. 14.
63. UN Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Commentary on 
Article 7 (1 Jan. 1980), Models IBFD. The UN Model (2011) notes at the 
end of art. 7 that “The question of whether profits should be attributed 
to a permanent establishment by reason of the mere purchase by that 
permanent establishment of goods and merchandise for the enterprise 
was not resolved. It should therefore be settled in bilateral negotiations”. 
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(article 10(1)). As long as the beneficial owner of divi-
dends is a resident of the other contracting state, the treaty 
rates of withholding tax apply. Both Models permit split 
rates for direct dividends and portfolio dividends. The 
UN Model leaves the specific rates blank, but the OECD 
Model sets a 5% rate for direct dividends and 15% rate for 
portfolio dividends. In order to qualify for the lower rate, 
the OECD Model requires the shareholder to hold directly 
at least 25% of the capital of the company paying the di-
vidends (article 10(2)), whereas the UN Model requires 
the shareholder to hold directly at least 10% of the capital 
of the company paying the dividends. Dividends that are 
effectively connected with a PE of the shareholder in the 
source country are taxable under article 7 (article 10(4)).
China’s tax treaties closely follow the OECD Model with 
the exception of the split rates. The majority of these tax 
treaties provide for a single withholding tax rate, although 
more recent tax treaties use split rates (see Table 5 in the 
Appendix). The standard rate of withholding is 10%.71 In 
the case of split rates, 5% is generally used for direct divi-
dends. In addition, some of the recent Chinese tax treaties 
contain a specific anti-abuse provision, which is discussed 
in more detail in section 5.6.
Chinese domestic law imposes a 10% withholding tax 
on dividends received by a non-resident, irrespective 
of the percentage of equity ownership.72 For treaty pur-
poses, the term “dividends” is interpreted to include 
the amount of interest that exceeds the limits under the 
thin capitalization rules and is taxed as dividends under 
domestic law.73 The distinction between debt and equity 
(interest and dividends) is based on the substance-over-
form principle. If the form of investment is debt but the 
lender actually bears the risks of the borrowing company, 
the interest can be regarded as a dividend. The SAT Treaty 
Interpretation Circular sets forth the following factors in 
determining whether or not a lender shares the risks of 
the company:
 – the amount of the loan significantly exceeds other 
forms of investment in the company and is substan-
tially unmatched by assets with liquidity;
 – the lender shares in any profits of the company;
 – the repayment of the loan is subordinated to claims of 
other creditors or to the payment of dividends;
 – the level of payment of interest depends on the profits 
of the company; and
 – the lending contract does not specify the exact date 
of repayment.
The equity ownership percentage required to qualify for 
the lower rate for direct dividends includes both direct 
ownership and indirect ownership. The SAT’s policy is 
71. The 15% rate is used in very few tax treaties, such as those with Australia, 
Canada and the Philippines; and a 10% rate is used for portfolio dividends 
in the tax treaty with the Philippines and a 7% rate in the tax treaty with 
Austria.
72. Art. 91 EIT Regulations. Until 2008, the rate was zero. See CN: Income 
Tax Law of the People ’s Republic of China for Enterprises with Foreign 
Investment and Foreign Enterprises art. 19, National Legislation IBFD 
promulgated by the National People ’s Congress on 9 April 1991 (the 
“FIET Law”).
73. Art. 10 Guoshuifa [2010] No. 75, supra n. 14.
China’s tax treaties generally include article 7(4) and (5).66 
Under Chinese domestic law, it has been customary to 
use the deemed profit methods in computing taxable 
income of non-resident enterprises carrying on business 
in China.67 The deemed profit methods are used when en-
terprises do not maintain accurate accounting books and 
cannot declare and pay taxes on an actual basis.68 There 
are three bases for determining the deemed profits: (1) 
total revenue; (2) costs and expenses; and (3) operating 
expenditures. The deemed profits rates are 15% to 30% 
for engineering projects, design and consulting services; 
30% to 50% for management services; and not less than 
15% for other services or other businesses.69
The SAT Treaty Interpretation Circular recognizes the 
possible differences in the outcome of using the appor-
tionment method and actual profit method (based on 
the accounting records of the taxpayer). The SAT also 
acknowledges the difficulties in applying the apportion-
ment method, as it is not easy to determine and verify the 
total profit of the non-resident enterprise. It is difficult for 
the tax authorities of the source country to determine the 
profit of the head office or the taxable profit as assessed by 
the tax authorities in the residence country.
4.4.  Investment income, capital gains and other 
income
4.4.1.  Overview
Treaty provisions on dividends, interest, royalties, capital 
gains and other income are good indicators of the scope 
of source-country taxation. Because the residence country 
always has the jurisdiction to tax such income and the 
obligation to provide relief from double taxation, tax trea-
ties differ in respect of the scope of source taxation. As in 
the case of business profits, the extent of incorporation 
of the UN Model in China’s tax treaties reveals China’s 
treaty policies. An overview is presented in Table 5 in the 
Appendix.
4.4.2.  Dividends
Article 10 of the OECD Model and the UN Model are 
largely identical.70 The source country is defined to be the 
residence country of the company that pays the dividends 
66. A small number of China ’s tax treaties do not contain these two 
provisions. Examples are the original tax treaty with the United Kingdom 
and the tax treaty with Turkey.
67. For further discussion, see Cao, supra n. 25, at pp. 33-43 and P. Tao & 
S. Kim, A Brief Examination of Recent Chinese Tax Rules on Nonresident 
Enterprises, The Tax Mag. p. 35 (Dec. 2009) and An Update on Recent 
Chinese Tax Rules on Nonresident Enterprises, The Tax Mag. p. 33 (Nov. 
2010).
68. SAT, Guoshuifa [2010] No. 19, Notice on the Administrative Measures 
Concerning Income Tax Collection on Non-resident Enterprises on 
Deemed Basis (20 Feb. 2010).
69. It is questionable as to whether or not the deemed 15% profit rate 
(previously, 10%) is consistent with article 7 of tax treaties. Ecker & Tang, 
supra n. 54, at pp. 40-41.
70. As the UN Model has art. 14 (independent personal services), when a PE 
is referred to in the OECD Model, the “fixed base” concept is included in 
the UN Model in respect of determining if the dividends are connected 
to a PE or fixed base to be taxed under art. 7, as opposed to art. 10. The 
UN Model also leaves the withholding tax rate blank to allow the two 
countries greater flexibility.
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4.4.4.  Royalties
The scope of source taxation is much broader under the 
UN Model than under the OECD Model, which provides 
for exclusive jurisdiction to the residence country. The UN 
Model allows the source country to tax royalties at a limited 
rate (left blank) and expands the definition of “royalties”.
The definition of “royalties” under the UN Model is the 
same as under earlier OECD Model (1992),82 including 
equipment rental as royalties. Both Models include in the 
definition of royalties payments for the use of or the right 
to use industrial property (copyright, patent, trademark, 
design or model, plan, secret formula or process and pay-
ments for information concerning industrial, commercial 
or scientific experience).
Article 12(4) of the UN Model provides that royalties 
that are effectively connected with a PE are covered by 
article 7. Article 12(5) defines the source of royalties to 
be the payer’s residence country. However, if the payer 
has a PE in one of the treaty countries and the royalties 
are incurred in connection with the PE and are borne by 
such PE, whether or not the payer is a resident of that 
country, the royalties are deemed to arise in that country. 
In other words, the “base-erosion” test trumps the payer’s 
residence test. Under article 12(5) of the UN Model, if 
by reason of a special relationship between the payer and 
the beneficial owner or between both of them and some 
other person, the amount of royalties, in excess of the 
arm’s length amount, is not eligible for the reduced rate.
China’s tax treaties follow the UN Model. Many treaties 
allow a lower rate (6% or 7%) of withholding tax on equip-
ment rental (which is the lower rate shown in Table 5 in 
the Appendix).83
The SAT Treaty Interpretation Circular offers some guid-
ance on the meaning of “royalties”.84 Royalties in respect of 
industrial or intellectual property rights include payments 
for such rights whether such rights are registered under 
Chinese law or whether the payments are made under a 
licence or for damages for infringement. The term “infor-
mation concerning industrial, commercial or scientific 
experience” should be understood as “proprietary tech-
nology”. Proprietary technologies generally refer to the 
information that is not disclosed to the public and is nec-
essary for the duplication of a product or a production 
process. Royalties on licensing proprietary technologies 
usually involve the permission to use such information 
by a licensee where the licensor does not normally partici-
pate in the implementation of the technology and does not 
guarantee the result of such implementation. The licensed 
technology normally already exists, but may include tech-
nologies to be developed subsequently pursuant to the 
needs of the licensee and the use of which is subject to 
the confidentiality provision of the contract.
82. OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (1 Sept. 1992),
Models IBFD was amended in to eliminate equipment rental from art. 12.
83. Very few tax treaties deviate from the 10% rate. For instance, the rates are 
25% and 10% in the tax treaty with Brazil, 15% and 10% in the tax treaties
with Malaysia and the Philippines, and 12.5% in the tax treaty with 
Pakistan. Presumably, these rates were insisted on by the other country.
84. Art. 12 Guoshuifa [2010] No. 75, supra n. 14.
to look at the equity ownership of a non-resident inves-
tor during a 12-month period prior to the receipt of divi-
dends. If the required equity ownership ratio (typically 
25%) is exceeded at any time during this period, the lower 
treaty rate applies.74
4.4.3.  Interest
Article 11 of the OECD Model is largely reproduced in 
the UN Model, except that the UN Model leaves the rate 
of withholding tax blank (as in the case of article 10(2)).75 
The source country is determined by the payer’s residence 
or under the base-erosion rule. Under the base-erosion 
rule, where a Chinese non-resident has a PE in China and 
pays interest to a beneficial owner resident in the other 
contracting state, if the interest is borne by the compa-
ny’s PE in China, the interest is deemed to arise in China. 
Interest may be taxed as business profits under article 7 
if it is effectively connected with a PE of the beneficial 
owner in the source country. Article 11(6) clarifies that the 
treaty reduced rate is not available to the amount of inter-
est that exceeds the arm’s length amount due to a special 
relationship between the payer and the beneficial owner 
or between both of them and some other person.
China’s tax treaties follow the OECD Model. Chinese 
domestic law imposes a 20% withholding tax on interest 
received by a non-resident.76 This rate is reduced to 10% by 
Chinese tax treaties.77 A zero rate is generally provided for 
interest on loans received by the “government” or “policy 
banks” (such as the China Development Bank, the Export-
Import Bank and their equivalent in the other contracting 
state).78 Interest that is effectively connected with a PE in 
China is taxable at the standard corporate tax rate of 25% 
on a net basis.79
The SAT Treaty Interpretation Circular clarifies that 
guarantee fees are treated as interest for the purposes of 
article 11, but only if the guarantee is attached to the debt 
that generates the interest, not provided as an indepen-
dent transaction.80 In the case of interest received by a ben-
eficial owner who is a resident of a treaty country from an 
enterprise that is a resident of a third country but main-
tains a PE in China and the interest expense is borne by 
the PE, the interest is deemed to arise in China and eli-
gible for the treaty reduced rate. However, if the debt is 
shifted by the third-country resident to the Chinese PE 
to take advantage of the tax incentives available to the PE, 
the reduced treaty rate does not apply.81 Some renegoti-
ated tax treaties also contain a general anti-abuse rule in 
article 11 and/or article 12 (see section 5.6.).
74. SAT, Guoshuihan [2009] No. 81, Notice on the Implementation of Tax 
Treaty Provision on Dividends, Circular No. 75, Article 10.
75. Art. 11(4) and (5) of the UN Model also refers to “fixed base” to reflect the 
fact that art. 14 is a separate provision in the UN Model, but not in the 
OECD Model.
76. Art. 3 EIT Law.
77. Some tax treaties provide for a lower rate. For instance, a 7% rate is used 
in the tax treaties with Algeria and Hong Kong, a 7.5% rate in the tax 
treaties with Cuba, Jamaica and Nigeria; and a 5% rate in the tax treaties
with Kuwait and Laos.
78. For instance, art. 11 of the P.R.C.–Sing. Income and Capital Tax Treaty.
79. Id., art. 3.
80. Art. 11 Guoshuifa [2010] No. 75, supra n. 14.
81. Id.
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did use the equipment was PanAmSat. CCTV only 
had the right to use a specified bandwidth.
(2) The characterization of income should be based on 
the contract between PanAmSat and CCTV. The 
contract clearly stated that PanAmSat was to provide 
transmission services and that no right to use any 
property was transferred to CCTV.
(3) The payments for the services provided under the 
contract gave rise to business profits for the purpose 
of the China–United States Income Tax Treaty 
(1986). As PanAmSat did not carry on business in 
China through a PE, such income was not taxable in 
China.
These arguments were rejected by the First Intermediate 
People’s Court of Beijing. The Court held that CCTV had 
the right to use a specified bandwidth and such bandwidth 
was part of the satellite system, and the payments for such 
fell within the scope of “royalties” for the purposes of the 
tax treaty. The services provided by PanAmSat were sub-
ordinate to the use of the satellite system. Article 11 of 
the China–United States Income Tax Treaty (1986) also 
does not explicitly state that the “right to use” any indus-
trial, commercial or scientific equipment is limited to the 
“actual possession and operation” of such equipment. 
Accordingly, the fact that CCTV did not actually possess 
and operate the satellite system could not support the con-
clusion that the payments gave rise to services fees taxable 
as business profits. The Intermediate Court’s decision was 
upheld by the Higher People’s Court of Beijing.91 This case 
has been controversial among Chinese commentators.92
4.4.5.  Capital gains
Both Models allow the source country to tax gains from 
the disposal of immovable property, movable property 
forming part of the business property of a PE (article 13(1)
(2)) and allow gains from the disposal of ships and aircraft 
operated in international traffic and for boats engaged in 
inland waterways transport and movable property per-
taining to the operation of such ships, aircraft and boats 
to be taxed in the country in which the place of effective 
management of the enterprise operating such ships, air-
craft and boats is situated.
Under articles 13(1) and 13(2), the source of gains is deter-
mined by the location of immovable property and the PE. 
With regard to gains from the alienation of shares deriv-
ing more than 50% of their value directly or indirectly 
from immovable property, article 13(4) of the UN Model 
(1980)93 allows the state where the immovable property is 
situated to tax the gains so that gains from the alienation of 
91. The Chinese text of this decision is available at http://shlx.chinalawinfo.
com/NewLaw2002/SLC/slc.asp?db=fnl&gid=117487335.
92. See Cui, supra n. 34; G. Tan, Tax Treaties’ Interpretation and Application 
under the Challenges of the Digital Economy – Issues Raised by PANAMSAT 
v. Beijing State Tax Bureau, 16, Revenue L. J. 1, p. 99 (2006); and S. Hao, 
The PanAmSat Case and Distinction between Business Profits and Royalties, 
in Wuda Guojie (reproduced by the China Academic J. Elec. Publg. H. at 
www.cnki.net) (in Chinese).
93. The UN Model (2001) extends this rule to interests in a partnership, trust 
or estate.
In respect of the distinction between service fees that are 
subject to article 7 (and/or article 14 under the UN Model) 
and royalties covered by article 12, the SAT provides the 
following guidance:
 – With regard to services furnished under a general 
contract, if proprietary knowledge and technologies 
are used in the process of providing services, in the 
absence of a licence for the use of such knowledge or 
technologies, the fees paid for services are not royal-
ties. However, if certain proprietary property is devel-
oped during the process of providing services and the 
service provider owns the property and the client only 
has a right to use, the fees paid for such services fall 
within the scope of royalties.85
 – With regard to technical support and instructions 
provided by the licensor in connection with the 
transfer or licensing of technology, the fees paid for 
such technical services are in the nature of royalties, 
whether the fees are charged separately or as part of 
the licence fees. However, if the services give rise to a 
PE, the service fees attributable to the PE are taxable 
under article 7.86
 – Fees paid in respect of after-sales services, warranties, 
professional services of engineering, management 
and consultancy are not in the nature of royalties.87
In addition, payments to a non-resident company for 
transmitting Chinese TV programmes by satellite to dif-
ferent parts of the world are characterized as equipment 
rentals sourced in China for the purposes of the China–
United States Income Tax Treaty (1986).88,89 The SAT 
interpretation was upheld by the Beijing Intermediate 
Court and Beijing High Court in PanAmSat International 
Systems, Inc. (2001).90
PanAmSat is arguably the only reported court decision on 
a substantive tax matter. In this case, the taxpayer was a 
resident of the United States. It argued that the payments 
at issue were for services provided and not for the right to 
use any equipment on the following grounds:
(1) The equipment was at all times under its control and 
operation and the Chinese client, CCTV, had no right 
to operate such equipment, and the equipment itself 
could not automatically execute the contract with 
CCTV. In other words, CCTV had no right to use 
any equipment and the only person who could and 
85. Id.
86. Id. The Circular continues to state that the individuals who provide the 
services are subject to art. 15 of the tax treaty.
87. Id. and SAT, Guiguihan [2009] No. 507, Notice on the Relevant Issues of 
the Application of Royalty Article of Double Taxation Agreements (14 
Sept. 2009).
88. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and 
the Government of the People ’s Republic of China for the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Tax Evasion with respect to Taxes 
on Income (30 Apr. 1984), Treaties IBFD [hereinafter: P.R.C.–U.S. Income 
Tax Treaty].
89. SAT, Guoshuihan [1999] No. 566, Reply on Issues Concerning the 
Imposition of Tax on Rental Income Derived by PanAmSat from Leasing 
Satellite Communication Lines to CCTV (19 Aug. 1999).
90. CN: BFIPC, 2001, PanAmSat International Systems, Inc. v. Beijing State Tax 
Bureau, yizhonghang chuzi No. 168 Administrative Judgement.
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 – The residence of the company whose shares are alien-
ated may be in China or the other country.
 – The percentage of equity ownership by the alienator 
is irrelevant to determining China’s tax jurisdiction 
over the gains.
 – The term “principally” means 50% or more.
 – The determination of whether or not more than 50% 
of the value of the shares alienated is derived from 
immovable property situated in China can be based 
on a three-year period (unless another period is stip-
ulated in the tax treaty).
 – The value of property is based on the book value.
 – The use of the term “indirectly” requires looking 
through the value of shares of lower-tier companies. 
For instance, a non-resident company, NRC, owns 
20% of a Chinese company, ChinaCo1, which in turn 
owns 80% of another Chinese company, ChinaCo2. 
ChinaCo1’s asset value is 100, including 40 in 
immovable properties in China. ChinaCo2’s asset 
value is 100, including 90 in immovable properties in 
China. In determining whether more than 50% of the 
value of shares in ChinaCo1 is derived from immov-
able property in China, the immovable property in 
ChinaCo2 is taken into account. ChinaCo1’s total 
value in immovable property is 40 (directly owned) 
plus 80 (indirectly owned, 80% x 90 = 72) and the 
total value in immovable property is 112, which is 
62% of the total value of 180. In other words, 62% 
of the value of ChinaCo1’s shares is derived, directly 
and indirectly, from immovable property in China. 100
The SAT interprets provisions based on article 13(5) of 
the UN Model very broadly, i.e.:
 – The 25% share ownership by a non-resident alienator 
is determined “historically” in the sense that once the 
25% threshold is met, the alienation of these shares 
would give rise to Chinese taxation, whether or not 
the shares are alienated in one transaction or several 
transactions. For instance, if a company resident in a 
treaty country acquired 40% of the shares of a Chinese 
company in Year 1, sells 20% of the shares in Year 2 
and the remainder in Year 3, even though the share 
ownership is only 20% in Year 3, the transaction is still 
within the scope of article 13(5). 101 If a tax treaty spec-
ifies a 12-month period for determining the owner-
ship percentage, the “historical” approach is replaced 
by the 12-month period.
 – “Indirect ownership” is determined by looking 
through equity percentage of lower-tier companies. 
For instance, if NR1 owns 5% of the shares of ChinaCo 
and 50% shares of NR2, which owns 50% of ChinaCo, 
NR1’s direct ownership is 5% and indirect ownership 
is 25%, resulting in a total ownership of 30%. When 
100. Art. 13 Guoshuifa [2010] No. 75, supra n. 14.
101. SAT Guoshuihan [2007] No. 403.
such shares and gains from the alienation of the underly-
ing immovable property are equally taxable in the source 
country. A similar provision was added to the OECD 
Model (2003).94 Article 13(5) of the UN Model, which has 
no equivalent in the OECD Model, further allows a state 
to tax gains from the alienation of shares (other than those 
covered by article 13(4)) representing a specified percent-
age of shares in a company which is a resident of that state. 
In other words, the source of such gains is determined by 
the residence of the company whose shares are alienated. 
The UN Model leaves the required equity ownership per-
centage to be determined through bilateral negotiations. 
With regard to gains from the alienation of any property 
other than that specifically covered by the rest of article 13, 
neither Model allows the source country to tax such gains.
Article 13(4) of the UN Model is found in many of China’s 
tax treaties (see Table 5 in the Appendix). Article 13(5) is 
contained in all renegotiated tax treaties and 40% of the 
tax treaties with European countries.95 The specified per-
centage of equity ownership under article 13(5) is gener-
ally 25%, which coincides with the percentage used for 
distinguishing between direct dividends and portfolio di-
vidends for the purposes of article 10. Some more recent 
tax treaties include a clause that is now found in the UN 
Model (2011), i.e. the equity ownership is determined 
during the 12-month period preceding the alienation. In 
addition, some recent tax treaties exclude shares of pub-
licly traded companies from the scope of article 13(5).96 
Some of China’s tax treaties reject the catch-call provision 
of both Models by allowing the source country to tax gains 
from the alienation of “other property”.97
Chinese domestic laws provide for extensive source-based 
taxation of capital gains, including gains from the sale of 
shares in the capital stock of Chinese resident compan-
ies.98 The taxation of gains from the alienation of shares 
in Chinese resident companies has been subject to much 
administrative interpretation. 99 The meaning of “shares of 
the capital stock of a company the property of which con-
sists directly or indirectly principally of immovable prop-
erty situated in China” is interpreted as follows:
 – The term “immovable property” has the same 
meaning as under Chinese domestic law, which 
includes land use rights.
94. OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (28 Jan. 2003), 
Models IBFD.
95. B. Folhs & W. Guo, Capital Gains (Article 13 OECD Model), in Lang, Liu 
& Tang, supra n. 27, at pp. 139-162.
96. This is similar to the suggested version in UN Model Tax Convention on 
Income and on Capital: Commentary on Article 13 para. 13 (1 Jan. 2011), 
Models IBFD.
97. Folhs & Guo, supra n. 95 demonstrate such deviation in Chinas tax 
treaties with Albania, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Norway, 
Romania, the Slovak Republic, Spain and Sweden.
98. Art. 3 EIT Law and Art. 7(3) EIT Regulations.
99. See, for example, Guoshuifa [2010] No. 75, supra n. 14 and SAT, 
Guoshuihan [2007], No. 43, Notice on the Interpretation and 
Implementation of Certain Articles of the Arrangement between the 
Mainland of China and the Hong Kong Administration Region for the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with 
respect to Taxes on Income (4 Apr. 2007).
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other evidence on the profession) issued by the compe-
tent tax authority of the residence country, and whether 
the contract governing the provision of services indi-
cates that the nature of the relationship is not one of em-
ployer and employee. A service provider is generally not 
treated as an employee if: (1) he or she does not enjoy the 
medical insurance, social insurance, paid vacations, over-
seas allowances and other benefits received by employees; 
(2) his/her remuneration is referenced to hours, weeks or 
months or paid in a lump sum; (3) the scope of the ser-
vices is fixed or limited by a time period; (4) the service 
provider is responsible for the quality of the work; and (5) 
the service provider bears the cost and expenses related to 
the performance of the contract.
4.5.3.  Dependent personal services and corporate 
directors
With regard to income from dependent personal services, 
China’s tax treaties generally follow the OECD Model and 
provide that the source country can tax the income where: 
(1) the employee is present in that country for more than 
183 days in a calendar year (or 12-month period); (2) the 
employer is a resident in that country; or (3) the compen-
sation is borne by the employer’s PE or fixed base located 
in that country. 
The meaning of the term “employer” is interpreted by the 
SAT to be “the person having rights with regard to the 
work produced and bearing the relative responsibility and 
risks”.106 In the case of international hiring-out of labour, 
the SAT requires a substance-over-form inquiry to deter-
mine the genuine relationship between the worker and the 
Chinese enterprise that receives the services. The worker 
may be an employee of the international hirer in form, but 
is, in reality, an employee of the Chinese enterprise if the 
Chinese enterprise that hires the services bears responsi-
bilities and risks associated with the work performed by 
the worker. Whether the Chinese enterprise is the em-
ployer depends on the circumstances, such as:107
 – whether it has the authority to instruct the worker;
 – whether the work is performed at a place that is under 
the control and responsibility of the Chinese enter-
prise;
 – whether the remuneration paid to the international 
hirer is calculated on the basis of the time utilized by 
the Chinese enterprise or whether the remuneration 
is connected in some ways to the salary received by 
the worker; 
 – whether tools and materials are put at the employee’s 
disposal by the Chinese enterprise; and
 – whether the number and qualifications of the worker 
are not solely determined by the international hirer.
Directors’ fees and similar payments derived by a resident 
of a treaty country as a member of the board of directors 
of a company resident in a treaty country are taxable in 
that country. Some of China’s tax treaties also adopt article 
16(2) of the UN Model, for example, those with Canada, 
106. Id., art.15.
107. Id., art.15.
NR1 alienates its shares in ChinaCo, the gains are 
taxable in China. 102
 – Share ownership of another person who is a member 
of a related group and has a significant economic rela-
tionship with the alienator may be attributed to the 
alienator. Such other person includes: (1) a person 
who has identical interest, such as a direct family 
member or an agent); (2) a person who directly owns 
100% of the alienator; and (3) a company wholly 
owned by a person in (1) or (2). For instance, Parent 
owns 100% of each of Sub1 and Sub2, and Sub1 is a 
resident of a treaty country. Each of Parent, Sub1 and 
Sub2 owns directly 10% of ChinaCo. For the purposes 
of applying article 13(5), Sub1 is deemed to own 30% 
of shares of ChinaCo. This deeming rule applies when 
there is no allegation of treaty abuse.
4.5.  Income from personal services
4.5.1.  Initial comments
China’s tax treaties have a mixture of provisions from the 
two Models in respect of income from independent ser-
vices, dependent personal services, directors’ fees, artistes 
and athletes, and students.
4.5.2.  Independent personal services
Article 14 was deleted in the OECD Model (2000) to 
reflect the OECD’s position that income from inde-
pendent personal services should be taxed in the source 
country on the basis of the PE as there was no difference 
intended between the concept of PE and “fixed base” as 
used in article 14. 
China’s tax treaties generally have a separate provision 
on independent personal services, but follow the UN 
Model. In addition to the “fixed base” test, China’s tax 
treaties employ the 183-day presence test found in the UN 
Model. China’s tax treaties with some developing coun-
tries contain a third condition for source taxation, i.e. the 
fees are paid by a resident in that country103 or are borne 
by a PE in that country.104
According to the SAT Treaty Interpretation Circular,105 
the characterization of services as “independent services” 
depends on whether there is any evidence of a profession 
(including professional licence, registration certificate or 
102. Art. 13 Guoshuifa [2010] No. 75, supra n. 14.
103. See, for example, Agreement Between the Government of the People ’s 
Republic of China and the Government of Malta for the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on 
Income (23 Oct. 2010), Treaties IBFD.
104. The Agreement Between the Government of Malaysia and the Government 
of the People ’s Republic of China for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and 
the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income art. 14(1) 
(23 Nov. 1985), Treaties IBFD provides that the source country may tax 
professional income if the person stays in that country for more 183 
days in the calendar year, or the income is paid by a resident or borne 
by a PE in that country and the amount exceeds USD 4,000. See also 
Agreement Between the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil 
and the Government of the People ’s Republic of China for the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes 
on Income (5 Aug. 1991), Treaties IBFD.
105. Art. 14 Guoshuifa [2010] No. 75, supra n. 14.
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4.7.  Prevention of double taxation and tax sparing
Following the Models, China’s tax treaties require the 
residence country to provide relief from double taxation. 
Most tax treaties adopt the credit method, but some adopt 
the exemption method111 or a combination of exemption 
and credit method.112
A tax sparing credit is included in many of China’s earlier 
tax treaties. It deems the source country’s tax that is “spared” 
or “waived” to be “paid” for the purposes of the foreign tax 
credit in the residence country. In tax treaties with devel-
oped countries, the tax sparing credit is often one-sided in 
favour of China. For instance, under the former China–
United Kingdom Income Tax Treaty (1984),113 the United 
Kingdom allowed a credit for Chinese taxes which would 
have been payable on business profits but for an exemp-
tion or reduction of tax under Chinese domestic law, i.e. 
articles 5 and 6 of the Joint Venture Income Tax (JVIT) 
Law (1980),114 article 3 of the JVIT Regulations, articles 4 
and 5 of the FIET Law (1991), or any other similar special 
incentive measures that are subsequently introduced by 
the Chinese government.115 With regard to investment 
income, Chinese tax is generally deemed to be paid at 
the treaty rate irrespective of the amount of Chinese 
tax actually paid.116 In a small number of tax treaties, a 
two-way or reciprocal tax sparing credit is provided, such 
as China’s tax treaties with Cyprus, Italy, Korea (Rep.), 
Kuwait, Malaysia, Malta, Pakistan and Thailand. The 
China–United States Income Tax Treaty (1986) does not 
provide for tax sparing, which reflects US treaty policy,117 
although the protocol nonetheless provides that it should 
be promptly amended to incorporate a tax sparing credit 
if the United States were to subsequently amend its laws 
concerning the provision of tax sparing credits or agree 
to grant such a relief to another country.118
111. For instance, business profits and most forms of personal service income, 
if subject to tax in China, are exempt from tax in Belgium, France, 
Germany, Norway and Sweden. The scope of the exemption varies from 
tax treaty to tax treaty. Belgium exempts all income other than dividends, 
interest and royalties; France and Germany add, to the non-exempt list, 
capital gains, directors’ fees and the income of artists and athletes.
112. For instance, Agreement Between the People ’s Republic of China and the 
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital 
art. 24(2) (12 Mar. 1994), Treaties IBFD provides for an exemption 
method for business profits and income for personal services and a credit 
method for investment income.
113. Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People ’s Republic of China 
for the Reciprocal Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal 
Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains (26 July 1984), 
Treaties IBFD [hereinafter: P.R.C.–U.K. Income Tax Treaty (1984)].
114. JVIT Law, supra n. 5.
115. Art. 23(3) P.R.C.–U.K. Income Tax Treaty (1984). Similar provisions are 
contained in the tax treaties with Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.
116. For instance, Chinese tax on dividends is deemed to have been paid at the 
rate of 10% under the tax treaties with Canada (on shares representing 
more than 25% equity), Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, 
Singapore and Sweden.
117. See H.M. Liebman, A Formula for Tax-sparing Credits in United States Tax 
Treaties with Developing Countries, 72 Am. J. Intl. L., p. 296 (1978).
118. P.R.C.–U.S. Income Tax Treaty, Exchange of Notes (30 Apr. 1984). This 
compromise, giving “most favoured nation” treatment to China in this 
regard, goes further than the United States has hitherto been prepared to 
go.
Kuwait, Norway, Pakistan, Sweden and Thailand, extend-
ing the same rule to salaries, wages and other similar 
remuneration derived by top-level managerial officials.108
4.5.4.  Entertainers and athletes 
Article 17 is the same in the two Models and is gener-
ally found in China’s tax treaties. It permits the source 
country (where services are performed) to tax income 
derived by entertainers and athletes whether the income 
is paid directly to the entertainers or athletes or to corpo-
rations. However, where income is derived from activi-
ties exercised in accordance with a cultural exchange pro-
gramme between China and the other country, the income 
is exempt from tax in the source country.
4.5.5.  Pensioners, students and professors
Article 18 deals with pensions. The OECD Model provides 
that pensions are taxable only in the residence state of the 
recipient. The UN Model provides for two alternatives. 
Alternative A allows exclusive residence country taxation 
with the exception of pensions and other payments made 
under a public scheme, which is taxable only in the source 
state. Alternative B allows the source country (where past 
employment was performed) and the residence country 
to share the taxation of pensions and similar payments, 
with the exception of public pensions, which are taxable 
only in the source country. China’s tax treaties are mixed 
in terms of following the Models.109
Article 19 of the two Models allocates exclusive source-
based taxation of remuneration paid in respect of govern-
ment services. Such a provision is generally contained in 
China’s tax treaties.
Under article 20 of the two Models, payments received by 
visiting students and business trainees for the purpose of 
their maintenance, education or training are not taxable 
in the visiting state as long as the payments are received 
from sources outside that state. China’s tax treaties follow 
the Models and extend the principle to visiting teachers 
and researchers.110
4.6.  Other income
Income that is not specifically covered by any article of the 
tax treaty (“other income”) is taxable only in the residence 
country of the taxpayer under article 22 of the OECD 
Model, but may be taxable in the source country under 
article 21(3) of the UN Model.
China’s tax treaties with OECD Member countries tend 
to follow the UN Model, whereas tax treaties with devel-
oping countries and transition countries tend to follow 
the OECD Model.
108. Such income is taxable in China under the general provision with regard 
to employment income, as the payer of the income is a company resident 
in China.
109. For further discussion, see O. Gunther, W. Xing & J. Zhang, Employment 
Income (Articles 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20 OECD Model), in Lang, Liu & Tang, 
supra n. 27, at pp. 174-178.
110. Id., at pp. 182-184.
Jinyan Li
468 BULLETIN FOR INTERNATIONAL TAXATION SEPTEMBER 2012 © IBFD
(1994),122 as amended by article 1 of the protocol (2006), 
contains a provision that denies treaty benefits to com-
panies (trusts or other entities) that would otherwise 
qualify as residents of Korea (Rep.) (or China), but benefit 
in Korea (Rep.) (or China) from a preferential tax regime 
restricted to foreign-held companies. This clause is based 
on paragraph 21.2 of the Commentary on Article 1 of the 
OECD Model (2010):123
In respect of Article 1 of the Agreement, it is understood that the 
Agreement shall not apply to any company, trust or other entity 
that is a resident of a Contracting State and is beneficially owned 
or controlled, directly or indirectly, by one or more persons who 
are not residents of that State, if the amount of the tax imposed 
on the income of the company, trust or other entity by that State 
(after taking into account any reduction or offset of the amount 
of tax in any manner, including a refund, reimbursement, contri-
bution, credit or allowance to the company, trust, or other entity 
or to any other person) is substantially lower than the amount 
that would be imposed by that State if all of the shares of the 
capital stock of the company or all of the interests in the trust or 
other entity, as the case may be, were beneficially owned by one or 
more individuals who were residents of that State. However, this 
paragraph shall not apply if 90 per cent or more of the income on 
which the lower amount of tax is imposed is derived exclusively 
from the active conduct of a trade or business carried on by it, 
other than passive income from investment business.
Similarly, article 4(5) of the Australia–China Income Tax 
Treaty (1988)124 denies the benefits under articles 10, 11 
and 12 to a company if a company has become a resident 
of a contracting state for the principal purpose of enjoy-
ing benefits under the tax treaty.
The SAT has given the term “resident of a Contracting 
State” a purposive interpretation on the basis of substance 
over form. Anti-avoidance is understood by the SAT to 
be one of the purposes of a tax treaty. For instance, a Bar-
bados company was denied the treaty exemption when 
it was discovered that the company’s directors were resi-
dents of the United States and through exchange of infor-
mation, the competent authority in Barbados confirmed 
that the Barbados company did not meet the residency 
requirement under Barbados law.125 Another example is 
the SAT’s requirement of the purpose test in determining 
the residence status under article 10 of the China–Hong 
122. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the 
Government of the People ’s Republic of China for the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on 
Income (28 Mar. 1994) (amended through 2006), Treaties IBFD.
123. A similar provision is contained in para. 21.2 of the UN Model: 
Commentary on Article 1 (2011).
124. Agreement Between the Government of Australia and the Government of 
the People ’s Republic of China for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income (17 Nov. 1988), 
Treaties IBFD.
125. SAT, Guoshuihan [2008] No. 76, A Case of the Appropriate Handling of 
Tax Treaty Abuse by the Xinjiang Yugur Autonomous Region State Tax 
Bureau (30 Dec. 2008). For further discussion, see D. Qiu, China ’s Capital 
Gains Taxation of Nonresidents and the Legitimate Use of Tax Treaties, Tax 
Notes Intl. p. 593 (22 Nov. 2010) and H. Yang, New Developments in the 
General Ant-Abuse Rules and the Impact on International Tax Planning, 15 
Asia-Pac. Tax Bull. 3 (2009), Journals IBFD.
More recent tax treaties often either do not contain a tax 
sparing clause or provide for a “sunset” requirement to 
phase out the credit over a specified period of time (see 
Table 6 in the Appendix). For example, the China–United 
Kingdom Income Tax Treaty (2011)119 no longer contains 
a tax sparing clause. Perhaps China sees less usefulness of 
tax sparing in attracting foreign investment to China due 
to the removal of tax incentives in domestic law.120 The 
trend may also reflect the fact that China is a net capital 
exporter with regard to many countries and a tax sparing 
clause does not serve China’s interest. More importantly, 
it may reflect China’s agreement with the OECD in respect 
of the potential abuse of tax sparing clauses.121
5.  Defending China’s Tax Base: Anti-Abuse 
Measures
5.1.  Overview
It is well accepted that the original purposes of tax treaties 
are the prevention of double taxation and fiscal evasion. 
There is no universal consensus on whether the preven-
tion of tax avoidance is a principal purpose of tax treaties. 
However, the most notable trend in China’s treaty policy 
is to enhance anti-avoidance measures (see Table 6 in the 
Appendix). These measures include:
 – residence in a treaty country (see section 5.2.);
 – LOB (see section 5.3.);
 – associated enterprises (arm’s length principle) (see 
section 5.4.);
 – beneficial ownership (see section 5.5.);
 – a general anti-treaty abuse rule (see section 5.6.); and
 – a domestic GAAR (see section 5.7.).
5.2.  Resident in a treaty country
As noted in section 3., China’s tax treaties apply only to 
persons resident in China or the other treaty country. 
Treaty benefits are denied if the residence test is not met. 
In addition to the general definition of “person” and “resi-
dent” under articles 3 and 4, there are specific provisions 
in some of China’s tax treaties that attempt to prevent 
improper use of a tax treaty, such as treaty shopping or 
using a treaty provision to achieve tax avoidance. For 
instance, the China–Korea (Rep.) Income Tax Treaty 
119. Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People ’s Republic of China 
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion 
with respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital Gains (27 June 2011), 
Treaties IBFD.
120. Until the 2008 tax reform, Chinese domestic laws provided numerous 
tax incentives to foreign-invested enterprises in China and foreign 
portfolio investors. Under the normal tax credit system, however, only 
taxes actually paid to the Chinese government are deductible from the 
investor ’s tax in the home country. Consequently, the net result is that 
taxes “spared” in China are paid instead to the home country and the 
investor does not benefit from Chinese tax concessions. In order to 
avoid this result, a tax sparing credit would deem the taxes exempted 
or reduced as taxes paid for the purposes of the foreign tax credit in the 
resident country. See J. Li, The Rise and Fall of Chinese Tax Incentives and 
Implications for International Tax Debates, 8 Fla. Tax Rev., pp. 670-712 
(2007).
121. OECD, Tax Sparing: A Reconsideration (1999). The recommendations 
were reflected in OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: 
Commentaries (29 Apr. 2000), Models IBFD.
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   (ii) in the case of relief from taxation under Articles 10 
(dividends), 11 (interest), and 12 (royalties), not more 
than 50% of the gross income of such person is used 
to make payments of dividends, interest and royal-
ties to persons who are other than persons described 
in clauses (A) through (C) of subparagraph (a)(i), 
whether directly or indirectly; or
 (b)   It is a company which is a resident of a Contracting State 
and in whose principal class of shares there is substan-
tial and regular trading on a recognized stock exchange.
2.  Paragraph 1 shall not apply if the establishment, acquisition 
and maintenance of such a person and the conduct of its op-
erations did not have as a principal objective the purpose of 
obtaining benefits under the Agreement.
According to this LOB provision, a resident of Mexico 
does not qualify for treaty relief in China, unless it is a pub-
licly traded company or a subsidiary of a resident indivi-
dual or publicly traded company, or it is not a “stepping-
stone” device, i.e. not more than 50% of the gross income 
is used to make payments of dividends, interest and roy-
alties to residents of a third country, or it meets the busi-
ness purpose exception.133
5.4.  Associated enterprises (arm’s length principle)
The arm’s length principle codified in article 9(1) of the 
OECD Model functions as an anti-avoidance rule in the 
sense that the tax base of the source (or residence) country 
cannot be eroded through transfer pricing. In determin-
ing the amount of profits attributable to a PE (or an asso-
ciated enterprise), the amount paid to, or received from, 
a related party must reflect the arm’s length price. Other-
wise, the tax authorities have the power to redetermine 
the amount.
In addition to article 9(1), articles 11(6) and 12(5) of the 
UN Model build on the anti-avoidance focus by restrict-
ing the treaty rate on interest and royalties to the amount 
that reflects the arm’s length price where the payer and 
payee are in a “special relationship”.
Articles 9(1), 11(6) and 12(5) of the UN Model are gener-
ally reproduced in China’s tax treaties. The arm’s length 
principle is found in Chinese domestic law.134 The SAT 
regards the transfer pricing rule as one of the “special 
adjustment rules” or anti-avoidance rules.135 In inter-
preting provisions based on articles 11(6) and 12(4) of the 
OECD Model, the SAT requires that reference be made to 
the relevant domestic anti-avoidance provisions and SAT 
guidelines on the application of these rules.136
133. In order to enforce the LOB rule, the SAT requires the tax authorities-in-
charge to collect information in addition to the resident certificate when 
considering whether to grant treaty benefits.
134. Art. 41 EIT. For further discussion of the transfer pricing rules in China, 
see J. Li, Resolving Transfer Pricing Disputes – China Chapter, in Resolving 
Transfer Pricing Disputes: A Global Analysis (E. Baistrocchi & I. Roxan 
eds., Cambridge U. Press forthcoming 2012) and Cao, supra n. 25, at pp. 
317-344.
135. SAT, Guoshuifa [2009] No. 2, Measures for the Implementation of the 
Special Tax Adjustment (trial) (1 Jan. 2009).
136. Arts. 11 and 12 Guoshuifa [2010] No. 75, supra n. 14.
Kong (2006)126 and China–Macau (2003)127 Income Tax 
Agreements.128 In general, if a transaction or arrangement 
was made for the principal purpose of obtaining favour-
able tax benefits under the tax treaty and the taxpayer 
inappropriately obtained treaty benefits through such a 
transaction or arrangement, the treaty benefits may be 
denied. This approach seems to be influenced by a sample 
provision suggested by paragraph 9.5 of the Commentary 
on Article 1 of the OECD Model (2010):129
A guiding principle is that the benefits of a double taxation con-
vention should not be available where a main purpose for en-
tering into certain transactions or arrangements was to secure a 
more favourable tax position and obtaining that more favourable 
treatment in these circumstances would be contrary to the object 
and purpose of the relevant provisions.
5.3.  LOB
Neither the OECD Model nor the UN Model contains 
an LOB article. However, the Commentary on Article 1 
of the OECD Model (2010) (paragraph 20, reproduced 
in paragraph 56 of the Commentary on Article 1 of the 
UN Model (2011)) suggests language for such an article 
if both contracting states are interested in such provision.
The LOB article is generally absent from China’s tax trea-
ties, except for the China–United States (1986)130 and the 
China–Mexico (2005)131 Income Tax Treaties. The LOB 
clause in these tax treaties is substantially similar. Article 
VI(1) and (2) of the protocol to the China–Mexico Income 
Tax Treaty (2005) reads as follows:132
1.  A person (other than an individual) which is a resident of a 
Contracting State shall not be entitled under this Agreement 
to relief from taxation in the other Contracting State unless:
 (a)   (i)  more than 50% of the beneficial interest in such per-
son (or in the case of a company more than 50% of 
the number of shares of each class of the company’s 
shares) is owned, directly or indirectly, by any com-
bination of one or more of:
       (A)  Individuals who are residents of one of the Con-
tracting States;
       (B)  Companies as described in subparagraph 1(b); 
and
       (C)  One of the Contracting States, its political sub-
divisions or local authorities; and
126. Arrangement Between the Mainland of China and the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income [unofficial 
translation] (21 Aug. 2006), Treaties IBFD.
127. Arrangement Between the Mainland of China and the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income [unofficial 
translation] (27 Dec. 2003), Treaties IBFD.
128. SAT, Guoshuihan [2009] No. 81.
129. This is reproduced in para. 23 of the UN Model: Commentary on Article 1 
(2011).
130. Protocol P.R.C.–U.S. Income Tax Treaty.
131. Agreement Between the Government of the People ’s Republic of China and 
the Government of the United Mexican States for the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on 
Income (12 Sept. 2005), Treaties IBFD.
132. The remainder of the article lists the recognized stock exchanges and 
require the competent authorities to consult with each other before treaty 
relief is denied under the LOB provision.
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 – its loan contract on which the interest arises is part 
of a “back-to-back” loan arrangement, i.e. the owner 
of the loan has a loan or deposit contract with third 
parties with similar amounts of principal, interest rate 
and time of conclusion of the contract; and
 – the licensor to an agreement on copyright, patent 
and technology licensing or transfer has a contract 
to license or transfer the property from a third party.
5.6.  General anti-treaty abuse rule
Neither Model currently contains a general anti-abuse 
provision. However, the Commentary on Article 1 of 
the OECD Model (2003)138 and Commentary on Article 
1 of the UN Model (2011) suggest sample provisions to 
be used in bilateral negotiations. For instance, paragraph 
21.4 of the OECD Commentary suggests the following to 
deal with source taxation of specific types of income under 
articles 10, 11, 12 and 21:139
The provisions of this Article shall not apply if it was the main 
purpose or one of the main purposes of any person concerned 
with the creation or assignment of the [Article 10: “shares or other 
rights”; Article 11: “debt-claim”; Articles 12 and 21: “Rights”] in 
respect of which the [Article 10: “dividend”; Article 11: “interest”; 
Articles 12 “royalties” and Article 21: “income”] is paid to take 
advantage of this Article by means of that creation or assignment.
Some of China’s tax treaties that were concluded after 
2006, such as the tax treaties with Belgium, Finland, Malta, 
Singapore and the United Kingdom, contain the above 
provision in articles 11 and 12. The SAT regards this type 
of provision as providing a basis for the applicable tax au-
thority of the source country to prevent treaty abuse.140 
However, as discussed in section 5.7., the absence of such 
explicit provision does not preclude the SAT from chal-
lenging treaty shopping under other anti-abuse rules, 
including the domestic GAAR.
5.7.  Domestic GAAR
There are no articles in the OECD Model or UN Model 
that explicitly allow treaty benefits to be denied by invok-
ing a domestic GAAR. However, paragraphs 9.5 and 21.2 
of the Commentary on Article 1 of the OECD Model 
(2010) and paragraphs 34 to 37 of the Commentary on 
Article 1 of the UN Model (2011) suggest the inclusion 
of such an explicit rule in a tax treaty. The UN Commen-
tary (2011) advises that “the use of such a provision would 
probably be considered primarily by countries that have 
found it difficult to counter improper uses of tax treaties 
through other approaches”.141
China’s tax treaties concluded before 2006 do not contain 
any provisions that allow the use of a domestic GAAR to 
counter treaty abuse. The domestic GAAR in China was 
138. OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Commentary on 
Article 1 (28 Jan. 2003), Models IBFD.
139. The OECD Commentary on Article 1 has been evolving since 1992. See 
also para. 22 of the Commentary on Article 1 of the UN Model (2001) and 
para. 23 of the Commentary on Article 1 of the UN Model (2011).
140. Art. 1 Guoshuifa [2010] No. 75, supra n. 14.
141. Para. 37 UN Model: Commentary on Article 1 (2011).
5.5.  Beneficial ownership
The beneficial ownership rule in articles 10, 11 and 12 of 
the two Models is universally included in China’s tax trea-
ties. Under this rule, the reduced treaty rate of withholding 
taxes on dividends, interest and royalties applies only to 
“beneficial owners” who are resident in the treaty country.
The concept of “beneficial ownership” is not found in 
Chinese domestic tax law. According to the SAT Guoshui-
han [2009] No. 601137 a “beneficial owner” is a person who 
has ownership of and control over an income or the rights 
and assets generating the income, and is generally engaged 
in substantial business activities. An agent or conduit 
company is not a beneficial owner. A conduit company 
is defined as one that is created for the purpose of avoiding 
or reducing tax, or shifting or accumulating profits. It is 
merely registered in a country to satisfy a legally required 
organization form and does not carry on any substantial 
business activities, such as production, trading and man-
agement. 
Guoshuihan [2009] No. 601 also states that the meaning 
of “beneficial owner” should not be given a literal inter-
pretation or a domestic law meaning. Instead, it should 
be interpreted in its context and in light of the object and 
purpose of the tax treaty, including the purpose of pre-
venting treaty abuse, and should be based on the relevant 
facts and circumstances in accordance with the principle 
of substance over form. A company (or trust) is not con-
sidered a beneficial owner if:
 – it is obligated to pay or distribute all or a substan-
tial portion (60% or more) of the income within a 
specified period of time (for example, 12 months) of 
receiving the income;
 – it has no or little business activity other than owning 
the assets or rights that generate the income;
 – its assets, scale of operations or number of employees 
are relatively small and not commensurate with the 
amount of income it receives;
 – it has no, or almost no, right of control or disposition 
over, the income or the assets or rights that generate 
the income and bears no or very little risk;
 – its income is taxed at a zero or very low effective tax 
rate in the other treaty country;
137. Guoshuihan [2009] No. 601, Notice on Interpretation and Determination 
of “Beneficial Owner” under Tax Treaties (17 Oct. 2009). In many ways, 
the SAT interpretation is broader than, the principles articulated in court 
decisions in Canada, France, and the United Kingdom in, for example, 
UK: CA, 2 Mar. 2006, Indofood International Finance Ltd v. JP Morgan 
Chase Bank NA [2006] E.W.C.A. Civ. 158, S.T.L. 1195, Tax Treaty Case 
Law IBFD; FR:CE, 29 Dec. 2006, Ministre de L’Economie, des Finances et 
de L’Industrie v. Societe Bank of Scotland, no. 283314. See 9 1TLR 1, Tax 
Treaty Case Law IBFD; and CA: TC, 22 Apr. 2008, Prévost Car Inc. v. 
Her Majesty the Queen, 2008 3080 (TCC), Tax Treaty Case Law IBFD, 
affirmed by CA: FCA, 26 Feb. 2009, Prévost Car Inc. v. Her Majesty the 
Queen, DTC 5053, Tax Treaty Case Law IBFD. For further discussion, see 
J. Li, “Beneficial Ownership” in Tax Treaties: Judicial Interpretation and the 
Case for Clarity in Essays in Honour of John F. Avery Jones: Tax Polymath: 
A Life in International Taxation (P. Baker & C. Bobbett eds., IBFD 2010), 
Online Books IBFD and N. Sharkey, China ’s Tax Treaties and Beneficial 
Ownership: Innovative Control of Treaty Shopping or Inferior Law-Making 
Damaging to International Law?, 65 Bull. Intl Taxn. 12 (2011), Journals 
IBFD.
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over-form principle applies when all of the following three 
conditions are met: (1) there is an abuse of the company 
form; (2) there is no bona fide commercial reason for the 
indirect sale of the shares in a Chinese company; and (3) 
the transaction would otherwise result in the avoidance 
of Chinese tax.
A number of transactions involving indirect transfers of 
shares of Chinese companies were assessed and claims for 
treaty exemption were denied. The tax treaties that were 
relied on by taxpayers include treaties with Singapore,145 
Hong Kong,146 Barbados147 and other jurisdictions.148 
For instance, the tax authorities in Xuzhou denied treaty 
exemption claimed by a resident of Barbados in respect 
of the gains realized in 2009 from the alienation of shares 
of a Chinese real estate company. At the time of the trans-
action, the China–Barbados Income Tax Treaty (2000)149 
did not contain an equivalent of article 13(4) of the UN 
Model that allowed the source country to tax gains from 
the alienation of shares of companies whose value is 
derived principally from immovable property located in 
China (such a provision was added in the 2010 Protocol). 
Relying on article 4 of the tax treaty, the Barbadian resi-
dence of the alienator was denied on the grounds that the 
company failed to prove that its place of effective manage-
ment was actually in Barbados.150
Another example of possible reliance on domestic GAAR 
in denying treaty benefits is illustrated by the following 
case.151 A company resident in Luxembourg held 25% of 
the shares in a Chinese resident company and acquired one 
additional share in the same Chinese resident company 
immediately prior to the distribution of dividends by the 
Chinese company. The Luxembourg company was wholly 
owned by another Chinese company based in Jinan, China 
(in other words, the Luxembourg company was an off-
shore company owed by a Chinese enterprise). The with-
holding tax rate under the China–Luxembourg Income 
145. For instance, in 2008, the Chongqing tax office reassessed a Singapore 
resident company on the gains realized from the alienation of another 
Singaporean company that held a 31.6% equity interest in a Chinese 
company located in Chongqing. The transaction took place before the 
introduction of the domestic GAAR and the inclusion of the GAAR 
article in the P.R.C.–Sing. Income and Capital Tax Treaty. Without 
explicitly relying on either the domestic GAAR or the treaty provision, 
the tax office appeared to rely on the general spirit behind the anti-abuse 
rules in denying the treaty exemption claimed by the Singapore company.
146. For instance, a Hong Kong resident company was reassessed by Yangzhou 
tax office on the gains realized from the sale of its shares of a Chinese 
public company to a US resident. See X. Yunxiang, Z. Jun & S. Yan, The 
Biggest Tax Revenue on a Single Indirect Transfer of Shares Conducted by 
Non-Residents, China Taxn. News (9 June 2010) (in Chinese).
147. See S. Yan, C. He & X. Yunxiang, The First Case Xuzhou Tax Authority 
Refused the Abuse of Tax of Tax Treaty, China Taxn. News (24 Feb. 2010) 
(in Chinese). See also the official website of the Xuzhou government on 23 
February 2010 at www.xz.gov.cn/zwgk/bmxx/20100223/09194237285.
html (in Chinese).
148. Some of the cases occurred even before the GAAR was enacted. 
For further discussion of the highly controversial practice of the tax 
authorities in assessing indirect transfers of shares of Chinese companies, 
see D. Qiu, China ’s Capital Gains Taxation of Nonresidents and the 
Legitimate Use of Tax Treaties, Tax Notes Intl., p.593 (22 Nov. 2010).
149. Agreement Between the Government of Barbados and the Government of 
the People ’s Republic of China for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income (15 May 2000), 
Treaties IBFD.
150. See Qiu, supra n. 148, at pp. 620-621.
151. The China Tax News (31 Aug. 2011) (in Chinese).
enacted in 2007 and became effective on 1 January 2008.142 
Some post-2006 tax treaties include such a provision (see 
Table 6 in the Appendix). For instance, article 26 of the 
China–Singapore Income Tax Treaty (2007) states:
Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the right of each Con-
tracting State to apply its domestic laws and measures concern-
ing the prevention of tax avoidance, whether or not described 
as such, insofar as they do not give rise to taxation contrary to 
the Agreement.
Article 26 clearly authorizes the competent tax authorities 
to apply their respective GAAR to residents of the other 
country, so long as the resulting taxation is not inconsis-
tent with the tax treaty.
In practice, however, it appears to be clear that an explicit 
GAAR article in a tax treaty is included for the purposes 
of greater certainty. The absence of such a provision in a 
tax treaty does not mean that the GAAR is not relied on 
by the Chinese tax authorities. The tax authorities may 
instigate a GAAR investigation on any enterprise that is 
suspected of treaty abuse, of abuse of the corporate form, 
of tax avoidance using tax havens or entering into other 
arrangements without a reasonable business purpose.143 
The tax authorities also adopt the substance-over-form 
principle in determining whether or not an enterprise has 
a tax avoidance arrangement and consider the following 
factors:144
 – the form and substance of an arrangement;
 – the creation time and implementation period of an 
arrangement;
 – the implementation method of an arrangement;
 – the relationship between each of the steps or compo-
nents of an arrangement;
 – the changes in each party’s financial situation 
involved in an arrangement; and
 – the tax consequences of an arrangement.
The SAT has applied the GAAR (especially the substance-
over-form principle) in taxing non-resident enterprises 
that have alienated shares of an offshore holding company 
that held shares in Chinese operating companies. For 
example, Guoshuihan [2009] No. 698 requires an off-
shore company to report to the tax authorities in charge 
of a transaction involving a Chinese non-resident alienat-
ing shares of the company to another non-resident where 
the actual tax rate of alienator’s residence country is less 
than 12.5% or if the alienator’s gains from the transaction 
are tax-free in the residence country. On the basis of the 
information reported, the tax authorities in charge, after 
seeking the approval of the SAT, may apply the substance-
over-form principle and look through the intermediate 
holding company in determining the Chinese source of 
the gains from the alienation of the shares. The substance-
142. Art. 47 EIT Law and Art. 120 EIT Regulations. For discussion on this 
topic, see J. Li, Tax Transplants and Local Culture: A Comparative Study 
of the Chinese and Canadian GAAR (2009) 11 Theoretical Inquiries in 
L. 2, pp. 75-105 (2009) and D. Buss et al., China: Will It Challenge Tax 
Motivated Treaty Shopping Structuring?, 86 Tax Mag., p. 13 (2008).
143. Art. 92 Guoshuifa [2009] No. 2, supra n. 135.
144. Id., art. 92. In conducting a GAAR investigation, the tax authorities 
may request the instigators of the tax avoidance arrangement to provide 
relevant materials and supporting evidence.
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all potentially apply in determining the entitlement of the 
China–Hong Kong Income Tax Arrangement (2006).
The use of a Hong Kong company as a financing vehicle by 
mainland Chinese companies gives rise to additional tax 
issues, such as the residence of the company for Chinese 
tax purposes. As discussed in section 3.3., if the place of 
effective management of a Hong Kong company is in 
Mainland China, the company is regarded as a Chinese 
resident. One of the implications of such a status is that 
the company is entitled to benefits under China’s tax trea-
ties. On the other hand, the disposalition of shares of the 
Hong Kong company by offshore investors may give rise 
to Chinese capital gains tax because the source of the gains 
is determined by the residence of the company.
6.  Patterns and Trends in China’s Treaty Policy
6.1.  General patterns
This study of the selected tax treaties shows some notable 
patterns and trends in China’s tax treaties and treaty prac-
tice. One notable pattern is the influence of the OECD 
Model and Commentaries and the UN Model and Com-
mentaries. Such influence goes beyond the incorporation 
of the provisions of the Models. Some concepts, princi-
ples and approaches in the Commentaries have also been 
adopted into Chinese tax treaties and treaty practice. For 
instance, the attribution of ownership of shares of related 
companies or persons to the taxpayer that alienates shares 
in a Chinese company is probably inspired by a similar 
view found in paragraph 11 of the Commentary on Article 
13(5) of the UN Model (2011):
It will be up to the law of the State imposing the tax to determine 
which transactions give rise to a gain on the alienation of shares 
and how to determine the level of holdings of the alienator, in 
particular, how to determine an interest held indirectly. An in-
direct holding in this context may include ownership by related 
persons that is imputed to the alienator. Anti-avoidance rules of 
the law of the State imposing the tax may also be relevant in de-
termining the level of the alienator’s direct or indirect holdings.
Another pattern is that China’s tax treaties with OECD 
Member countries tend to have a broader scope of source 
taxation than those with non-OECD countries, especially 
in the case of business profits. There are no discernible dif-
ferences between tax treaties with treaty haven countries 
and other tax treaty countries, in terms of the scope of 
source taxation of dividends, interest and royalties. There 
is also a notable pattern of adopting anti-abuse rules in 
more recent tax treaties with countries that have a more 
sophisticated tax law system and are capital exporters to 
China.
Finally, there are significant differences between tax trea-
ties concluded before and after the major reform insti-
gated by the EIT Law (2007), which reduced the standard 
tax rate, abolished most of the tax incentives and intro-
duced the GAAR and specific anti-avoidance rules, such 
as thin capitalization and CFC rules.
In terms of treaty policy, there appears to be a general 
shift away from taking the stance of a net capital importer 
country. This is evidenced by the removal of the tax 
and Capital Tax Treaty (1994)152 is 5% for direct dividends 
and 10% for portfolio dividends. In order to qualify for 
direct dividends, the equity ownership must be more than 
25%. The Jinan State Tax Bureau denied the treaty benefit 
on the grounds that the Luxembourg company had not 
held its interest in the dividend-paying company for 12 
months before the dividend declaration. The “12-month 
holding period” requirement was omitted from article 10 
of the tax treaty, but referred to in the SAT circular regard-
ing the implementation of treaty dividend provisions.153 
The acquisition of the one additional share was also likely 
to be considered to be offensive from the perspective of 
the GAAR.
5.8.  The role of Hong Kong
While the SAT is increasingly concerned with treaty abuse, 
China is, at the same time, growing its treaty network. 
What is also interesting to note is that Hong Kong has 
also begun developing its treaty network (see Table 7 in the 
Appendix). The combination of the China-Hong Kong 
Income Tax Arrangement (2006) and Hong Kong’s treaty 
network presents attractive tax planning opportunities for 
investors and potential treaty abuse situations for the tax 
authorities. Hong Kong’s treaty partners include not only 
major capital exporting countries, such as France, Japan 
and the United Kingdom, but also some treaty-based tax 
havens, such as Ireland, Luxembourg and the Nether-
lands.
It is beyond the scope of this article to examine and 
compare Hong Kong’s tax treaties with China’s tax trea-
ties.154 It is sufficient to note that Hong Kong’s tax trea-
ties generally follow the OECD Model, and adopt a nil 
or very low rate of withholding tax on dividends, interest 
and royalties.
In terms of the source-country taxation of capital gains, 
gains from the alienation of shares deriving their value 
principally from immovable property are taxed in the 
source country (article 13(4) of the UN Model), but gains 
from the alienation of shares of other companies are gen-
erally not taxable in the source country (article 13(5) of the 
UN Model). As such, Hong Kong’s position as a gateway 
to China is strengthened by its tax treaties. This is par-
ticularly the case when an investor’s home country does 
not have a tax treaty with China, or has a treaty that pro-
vides for higher withholding tax rates or a broader scope 
of source country taxation.
The use of a Hong Kong company as a vehicle for invest-
ment in China is subject to the scrutiny of Chinese tax 
authorities when treaty benefits are claimed. The anti-
avoidance measures, discussed in sections 5.6. and 5.7., 
152. Agreement Between the People ’s Republic of China and the Grand Duchy 
of Luxembourg for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention 
of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital (12 Mar. 
1994), Treaties IBFD.
153. SAT Guishuihan [2009] No. 81.
154. For an overview, see S. Cho, The Mainland of China and the Hong Kong 
SAR Double Taxation Arrangement – An Overview and Implications for Tax 
Planning, 34 Intl. Tax J., p. 45 (2008) and J. Vanderwolk, Hong Kong ’s New 
Tax Treaty Network, 9 eJournal of Tax Research, p. 254 (2011).
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6.3.  Strengthening source taxation over passive 
income and capital gains
As indicated in Table 5 in the Appendix, China’s tax trea-
ties follow a clear pattern of withholding tax rates under 
articles 10, 11 and 12. The rate is generally capped at 10% 
and not reduced, even in tax treaties with the “treaty 
haven” jurisdictions. Other than the 5% rate on direct di-
vidends, there is no systematic difference across countries 
or across time. Accordingly, the level of withholding tax 
rates indicates a reduction in the scope of source taxation 
rather than strengthening it. However, if the anti-abuse 
rules (beneficial ownership and the excessive interest and 
royalty provision under articles 11(6) and 12(5) of the UN 
Model) are taken into account, the effect is strengthening 
source taxation of passive income.
In the case of capital gains, there is a clear trend in strength-
ening source taxation by incorporating article 13(4) 
(shares deriving value primarily from immovable prop-
erty) and article 13(5) (direct shares) of the UN Model. 
While the earlier tax treaties with Denmark, Japan and 
the United States do not include these provisions, subse-
quent tax treaties generally incorporate one or both. For 
instance, article 13(4) is contained in all of the selected tax 
treaties, with the exception of those with Brazil, Brunei, 
Cuba, the Czech Republic, Kazakhstan, Mexico, the Neth-
erlands, Syria and Turkmenistan and article 13(5) is in-
cluded in most tax treaties with tax havens (Luxembourg 
(1994), Mauritius (1994) and Barbados (2011)) and rene-
gotiated tax treaties.
6.4.  Aggressive stance on treaty abuse
Prior to 2006, the only general anti-abuse provision was 
the LOB provision contained in the tax treaties with 
Mexico and the United States. Since 2006, each renegoti-
ated tax treaty contains one or both of the provisions codi-
fying a business purpose type of a general anti-abuse rule 
or the use of a domestic GAAR in countering treaty abuse 
(see Table 6 in the Appendix). These provisions are based 
on the provisions suggested in the OECD Commentary 
and/or UN Commentary as opposed to provisions in the 
Models per se. In this respect, China can be considered 
an early adopter of such provisions or a mover of an anti-
treaty abuse trend.
6.5.  Some explanatory factors
It is beyond the scope of this article to fully discuss the 
internal and external factors that may help explain the 
trends and patterns noted in sections 6.1. to 6.5. A few 
highlights may suffice. One factor is China’s rise as an 
economic power. The world ranking of China’s GDP 
was ninth in 1980, fifth in 2005, and second in 2010.155 
Inbound FDI into China was valued at USD 916 million 
in 1983 and USD 11,6011 million in 2011.156 Outbound 
155. See International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, 
available at www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/01/weodata/
download.aspx. 
156. Source: www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI/wztj/wstztj/lywztj/t20120119_140560.
htm).
sparing clause in the majority of renegotiated tax treaties 
and reducing the rate of withholding tax rate on direct 
dividends to 5%.
6.2.  Scaling down source taxation of business profits
On the basis of the data in Table 5 in the Appendix, com-
pared to the earlier set of tax treaties with OECD Member 
countries, such as those with Japan (1983), the United 
States (1984), Denmark (1986) and Australia (1988), the 
scope of source country taxation of business profits is nar-
rower in tax treaties with transition countries and devel-
oping countries, as well as in tax treaties renegotiated after 
2006.
The definition of PE is narrower in tax treaties with non-
OECD countries or lower-income OECD countries, such 
as Mexico. This is evidenced by specifying a longer period 
of time for supervisory services to constitute a PE (12 
months as opposed to six months). The tax treaties with 
Georgia, Greece, Mexico and Syria do not even follow 
article 5(3)(b) of the UN Model. The PE definition is also 
narrower by not deeming an independent agent to consti-
tute a PE under article 5(7), examples of which are tax trea-
ties with Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Georgia, 
Finland (2010) and Mexico.
The limitation on deductions in attributing profits to a PE 
under article 7(3) of the UN Model was included in the 
earlier tax treaties, for example, the United States (1984), 
Denmark (1986), Australia (1988), the Netherlands (1987) 
and Malaysia (1985), but missing in most other tax treaties 
covered by this study. The only tax treaties that contain the 
limitation rule were those with Mexico (2005), Kazakh-
stan (2002), Cyprus (1990) and Hong Kong (2006).
The trend of scaling down source taxation of business 
profits indicates a shift in China’s interest in defining 
and defending its tax base. During the earlier years, China 
was a net capital importer and was, therefore, interested 
in having a broader scope for source taxation. This is 
particularly the case with major OECD Member coun-
tries. In more recent years, China has become a capital 
exporting country. Even with the major OECD Member 
countries, while China remains a net capital-importer, 
China’s investment in these countries increased, pre-
sumably resulting in more two-way traffic. As such, the 
policy concerns over source-based taxation remain, but 
to a lesser extent. With regard to non-OECD countries, 
China is often a net capital exporter and would be expected 
to distant itself from the UN Model and bargain for nar-
rower source country taxation. In practice, however, 
China’s tax treaties with non-OECD countries still follow 
the UN Model, although to a lesser degree compared to 
the tax treaties with the OECD Member countries. This is 
perhaps due to China’s understanding of the position of 
capital-importing countries and, consequently, China was 
more willing to accommodate their concerns than typical 
OECD Member countries.
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7.  Conclusions
This study of selected Chinese tax treaties and the 
treaty interpretation supports the claim that the 
treaty network plays an important role in defining 
and defending China’s tax base. The network 
consists of close to 100 tax treaties that have 
been concluded since 1983. It could be said that 
China’s treaty network functions as a Great Fiscal 
Wall of China. Even though China’s tax treaties 
are based on the OECD Model and UN Model, 
they have some distinguishing features that start 
to give shape to a Chinese identity.
In an article published in 1998,159 Brian Arnold 
and the author predicted that “[o]wing to its 
increasing importance in the world economy 
and growing sophistication of the Chinese tax 
system, China will likely play an important 
role in shaping the international tax norms in 
the next century”.160 Such a view is shared by 
other commentators.161 This article presents 
evidence that China is no longer just a norm 
taker, but a norm mover, especially in respect 
of treaty abuse issues. In this sense, elements of 
China’s tax treaties will most likely find their way 
into tax treaties concluded by other countries. 
Interestingly, while the iconic Great Wall cannot 
be duplicated by other countries, the Great Fiscal 
Wall of China can be. 
159. Arnold & Li, supra n. 27.
160. Id., at p. 87.
161. See, for example, Ecker & Tang, supra n. 54, at p. 78.
FDI was valued at USD 93 million in 1983 and USD 60,070 
million in 2011.157
A second factor is the importance of taxation in China. 
The amount of tax revenue was CNY 77,560 million in 
1983 and CNY 8,972,031 million in 2011. In 1983, the 
idea of income taxation was novel, affecting very few com-
panies and individuals. In 2011, it was one of the reasons 
why the Chinese complain about “tax misery”.158
A third factor is the growing sophistication of Chinese tax 
policy, legislation and administration. Chinese income tax 
policy was transformed from one that aimed at facilitating 
the transition from a centrally planned economy to one 
that aims at neutrality and equity demanded by a market-
based economy. If the number of articles in the tax law 
is any indication of sophistication, the evidence is clear, 
i.e. the JVIT Law (1980) contains 18 articles and 1,302 
words (excluding the Title of the legislation), whereas 
the EIT Law (2007) contains 60 articles and 5,345 words. 
The SAT interpretation bulletins and administrative mea-
sures, such as the Treaty Interpretation Circular, demon-
strate an impressive degree of understanding of the tech-
nical issues and policy implications.
Some external factors presumably have also affected 
China’s treaty policy. These include: the updates of the 
OECD Model and Commentary, as well as the UN Model 
and Commentary in the 1990s and 2000s, the growing 
awareness of aggressive tax planning strategies and the 
revenue effect of income shifting to low-tax jurisdic-
tions and China’s participation in the development of 
the Models, in joining the Joint International Tax Shelter 
Information Centre (JITSIC) and other organizations.
157. Source: www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI/wztj/jwtztj/t20120119_140581.
htm). Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), at http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/
reportFolders.aspx?sCS_referer=&sCS_ChosenLang=en. The increase 
in outbound FDI was considered a main reason behind China ’s change 
of treaty policy with regard to art. 7(3). See J. Khoo, China ’s Evolution as a 
Capital Exporter: A Shift in Tax Treaty Policy?, 37 Hong Kong L. J., p. 891 
(2007).
158. See, for example, How Should We Look at the Tax Burden?, Beijing Rev. 43 
(27 Oct. 2011), available at www.bjreview.com.cn/forum/txt/2011-10/24/
content_400222_2.htm and Mainland ’s “tax misery” highest in region: 
Forbes, The China Post (27 Sept. 2011), available at www.chinapost.com.
tw/business/asia-china/2011/09/27/317884/Mainlands-tax.htm. 
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Appendix
Table 1: Overview of China’s Tax Treaties (as at 31 January 2012)
Treaty partners Countries (year of conclusion)
OECD Member countries Japan (1983); the United States (1984); France (1984); the United Kingdom (1984, 
2011); Belgium (1985, 2009); Germany (1985); Norway (1986); Denmark (1986); Canada 
(1986, 2012); Finland (1986, 2010); Sweden (1986); New Zealand (1986); Italy (1986); the 
Netherlands (1987); the Czech Republic (1987, 2010); the Slovak Republic (1997); a  Poland 
(1988); Australia (1988); Switzerland (1990); Spain (1990); Austria (1991); Hungary (1992); 
Luxembourg (1994); Korea (Rep.) (1994); Slovenia (1995); Israel (1995); Turkey (1995); Iceland 
(1996); Portugal (1998); Estonia (1998); Ireland (2000); Greece (2002); and Mexico (2005).
Other BRICs Brazil (1991); Russia (1994); and India (1994).
Transition countries (other than 
OECD Member countries)
Bulgaria (1989); Romania (1991); Croatia (1995); Belarus (1995); Vietnam (1995); Ukraine 
(1995); Armenia (1996); Lithuania (1996); Latvia (1996); Uzbekistan (1996); Yugoslavia (1997); 
Macedonia (1997); Laos (1999); Moldova (2000); Kazakhstan (2001); Kyrgyzstan (2002); 
Albania (2004); Azerbaijan (2005); Georgia (2005); Tajikistan (2008); and Turkmenistan (2009).
Treaty havens (non-OECD) Cyprus (1990); Mauritius (1994); Barbados (2000, 2011); and Morocco (2002).
Developing countries Malaysia (1985); Thailand (1986); Kuwait (1989); Pakistan (1989); Mongolia (1991); Malta 
(1993, 2010); United Arab Emirates (1993); Papua New Guinea (1994); Jamaica (1996); 
Bangladesh (1996); Sudan (1997); Egypt (1997); Seychelles (1999); the Philippines (1999); 
South Africa (2000); Qatar (2001); Cuba (2001); Venezuela (2001); Nepal (2001); Indonesia 
(2001); Oman (2002); Nigeria (2002); Tunis (2002); Iran (2002); Bahrain (2002); Sri Lanka 
(2003); Trinidad and Tobago (2003); Brunei (2004); Saudi Arabia (2006); Algeria (2006); 
Singapore (1986; 2007); Ethiopia (2009); Zambia (2010); and Syria (2010).
Special Administrative Regions Hong Kong (1998, 2006, 2010); and Macau (2003, 2009).
Note a:  The Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic for the Avoidance of Double Taxa-
tion and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes On Income (11 June 1987), Treaties IBFD, applied to the Slovak Republic.
Table 2: Tax treaties selected for research
Type of treaty partner Country Year of conclusion
OECD Member countries Japan 1983
United States 1984
United Kingdom 1984
Canada 1986
Australia 1988
Greece 2002
Mexico 2005
Other BRICs Brazil 1991
Russia 1994
India 1994
Transition economies Bulgaria 1989
Croatia 1995
Kazakhstan 2002
Georgia 2005
Turkmenistan 2009
Treaty havens (OECD Member and other 
countries) Netherlands 1987
Luxembourg 1994
Mauritius 1994
Barbados 2000
Developing countries Malaysia 1985
Papua New Guinea 1994
Sudan 1997
Cuba 2001
Brunei 2004
Syria 2010
Renegotiated tax treaties Singapore 1986, 2007
Belgium 1985, 2009
Finland 1986, 2010
Malta 1993, 2010
United Kingdom 1984, 2010
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Table 3: Overview of relevant provisions of the UN Model and Commentaries
UN Model/Commentary Subject matter
 Business profits
Article 5(2) Deemed PE if building site and supervisory activities last more than six months
Article 5(3)(b) Deemed services PE if activities last more than six months 
Article 5(6) Deemed PE if insurance premiums are collected or risks situated in the source 
country
Article 5(7) Deemed PE if the activities of an independent agent are devoted wholly or 
almost wholly on behalf of the enterprise
Article 7(3) Limitations on deduction of expenses in attributing profits to a PE
 Investment income, capital gains and other income
Article 10(2) Lower rate for direct dividends
Article 11(2) Withholding tax rate
Article 12(2) Source-country taxation of royalties
Article 12(3) “Royalties” include equipment rental
Articles 11(6) and 12(5) Amount of interest and/or royalty in excess of the arm’s length not eligible for 
treaty rate
Article 13(4) Gains from the alienation of shares deriving value principally from immovable 
property are taxable in the source country
Article 13(5) Gains from the alienation of “direct shares” (if alienator owns more than the 
specified percentage of equity in the company) are taxable in the resident 
country of the company
Article 21(3) “Other income” may be taxable in the source country
 Anti-Abuse
Articles 10, 11 and 12 Beneficial owners resident in the other treaty country are entitled to reduced 
rates of withholding taxes
Article 9 and Articles 11(6) and 12(5) Arm’s length principle
Paragraph 56, Commentary on Article 1 Limitation on benefits
Paragraph 36, Commentary on Article 1 Denying treaty benefits where the main purpose is to obtain such benefits
Paragraph 21, Commentary on Article 1 Domestic GAAR may be applied in denying treaty benefits
Table 4: Articles 5 and 7 of the UN Model in selected Chinese tax treaties
Type of treaty 
partner
Country Article 5(3) 
supervisory 
activity
PE services Article 5(7) 
deemed 
dependent 
Agent 
Article 5(6) 
insurance
Article 7(3) 
limits on 
deduction
OECD Member 
countries
Japan (1983) Yes Yes Yes No No
United States (1984) Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Denmark (1986) Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Australia (1988) Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Switzerland (1990) Yes Yes Yes No No
Greece (2002) Yes (12 months) No Yes No No
Mexico (2005) Yes No No Yes Yes
Other BRICs Brazil (1991) Yes Yes Yes No No
Russia (1994) Yes (18 months) Yes (18 months) Yes No No
India (1994) Yes (183 days) Yes (183 days) Yes No No
Transition 
countries
Bulgaria (1989) Yes Yes No No No
Croatia (1995) Yes (12 months) Yes (12 months) Yes No No
Kazakhstan (2002) Yes (12 months) Yes (12 months) Yes No Yes
Georgia (2005) Yes No No No No
Turkmenistan (2009) Yes (12 months) Yes (183 days) Yes No No
Treaty havens Netherlands (1987) Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Cyprus (1990) Yes (12 months) Yes (12 months) No No Yes
Luxembourg (1994) Yes Yes Yes No No
Mauritius (1994) Yes (12 months) Yes (12 months) Yes No No
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Table 4: Articles 5 and 7 of the UN Model in selected Chinese tax treaties
Type of treaty 
partner
Country Article 5(3) 
supervisory 
activity
PE services Article 5(7) 
deemed 
dependent 
Agent 
Article 5(6) 
insurance
Article 7(3) 
limits on 
deduction
Developing 
countries
Malaysia (1985) Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Sudan (1997) Yes (18 months) Yes (12 months) Yes No No
Cuba (2001) Yes (12 months) Yes (12 months) Yes No No
Brunei (2004) Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Syria (2010) Yes (9 months) No Yes No No
Renegotiated tax 
treaties
Hong Kong (1998) Yes Yes Yes No No
Hong Kong (2006) Yes Yes (183 days) Yes No Yes
Singapore (1986) Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Singapore (2007) Yes Yes Yes No No
Belgium (1985) Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Belgium (2009) Yes (12 months) Yes (183 days) Yes No No
Finland (1986) Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Finland (2010) Yes Yes (183 days) No Yes No
Malta (1993) Yes (8 months) Yes (8 months) Yes No No
Malta (2010) Yes (12 months) Yes (183 days) Yes No No
Barbados (2000) Yes Yes Yes No No
Barbados (2011) Yes Yes Yes No No
United Kingdom (1984) Yes No Yes No Yes
United Kingdom (2011) Yes (12 months) Yes (183 days) Yes No No
Table 5: Source-country taxation of dividends, interest, royalties, capital gains and other income (UN Model)
Type of treaty partner Country Article 
10(2)
(%)
Article 
11(2) and 
(3) (%)
Article 
12(2) (%)
Article 
13(4)
Article 
13(5)
Article 
21(3)
OECD Member countries Japan (1983) 10 10, 0 10 No No Yes
United States (1984) 10 10, 0 10, 7 No No No
Denmark (1986) 10 10, 0 10, 7 No No Yes
Australia (1988) 15 10 10 Yes No Yes
Switzerland (1990) 10 10, 0 10, 6 Yes No No
Greece (2002) 5, 10 10, 0 10 Yes No No
Mexico (2005) 5 10, 0 10 No No No
Other BRICs Brazil (1991) 15 15, 0 25, 15 No No Yes
Russia (1994) 10 10, 0 10 Yes Yes No
India (1994) 10 10, 0 10 Yes No Yes
Transition countries Bulgaria (1989) 10 10, 0 10, 7 Yes No No
Croatia (1995) 5 10, 0 10 Yes Yes No
Kazakhstan (2002) 0, 5, 10 10, 0 5 No No No
Georgia (2005) 10 10, 0 10 Yes No No
Turkmenistan (2009) 5, 10 10, 0 10 No No No
Treaty havens Netherlands (1987) 10 10, 0 10, 6 No No Yes
Luxembourg (1994) 5, 10 10, 0 10, 6 Yes Yes No
Mauritius (1994) 5 10, 0 10 Yes Yes No
Barbados (2010) 5, 10 10, 0 10 Yes Yes No
Developing countries Malaysia (1985) 10 10, 0 10, 15 Yes No No
Sudan (1997) 5 10, 0 10 Yes Yes No
Cuba (2001) 5, 10 10, 0 7.5, 0 No No No
Brunei (2004) 5 10, 0 10 No No No
Syria (2010) 5, 10 10, 0 10 No No No
Special administrative regions Hong Kong (1998) 10 10 10 No No No
Hong Kong (2006) 5, 10 7, 0 7 Yes Yes Yes
Macau (2003, 2009) 5, 10 7, 0 10 Yes Yes Yes
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Table 5: Source-country taxation of dividends, interest, royalties, capital gains and other income (UN Model)
Type of treaty partner Country Article 
10(2)
(%)
Article 
11(2) and 
(3) (%)
Article 
12(2) (%)
Article 
13(4)
Article 
13(5)
Article 
21(3)
Renegotiated tax treaties Singapore (1986) 12, 7 7, 10, 0 10 Yes No Yes
Singapore (2007) 5, 10 7, 10, 0 10 Yes Yes Yes
Belgium (1985) 10 5, 10 10, 6 Yes Yes Yes
Belgium (2009) 5, 10 5, 10 7 Yes Yes Yes
Finland (1986) 10 10, 0 10 Yes No Yes
Finland (2010) 5, 10 5, 10 10 Yes Yes Yes
Malta (1993) Corporate 
tax rate
10, 0 10 Yes Yes No
Malta (2010) 5, 10 10, 0 10, 7 Yes Yes No
United Kingdom (1984) 10 10, 0 10, 6 No No No
United Kingdom (2011) 5, 15, 10 10, 0 10, 6 Yes Yes No
Table 6: Anti-abuse rules and tax sparing in selected Chinese tax treaties
Type of treaty partner Country Tax 
sparing
Beneficial 
owner
Excessive 
amount
General 
anti-
abuse rule
LOB Application 
of domestic 
GAAR
OECD Member countries Japan (1983) Yes Yes Yes No No No
United States (1984) Yes Yes Yes No Yes  No
Denmark (1986) Yes Yes Yes No No No
Switzerland (1990) Yes Yes Yes No No No
Mexico (2005) No Yes Yes No Yes No
Other BRICs Brazil (1991) No Yes Yes No No No
Russia (1994) No Yes Yes No No No
India (1994) No Yes Yes No No No
Transition countries Bulgaria (1989) No Yes Yes No No No
Croatia (1995) No Yes Yes No No No
Kazakhstan (2002) No Yes Yes No No No
Georgia (2005) No Yes Yes No No No
Turkmenistan (2009) No Yes Yes No No No
Treaty havens Netherlands (1987) Yes Yes Yes No No No
Luxembourg (1994) Yes Yes Yes No No No
Mauritius (1994) No Yes Yes No No No
Barbados (2000, 2010) No Yes Yes No No Yes
Developing countries Malaysia (1985) Yes Yes Yes No No No
Sudan (1997) No Yes Yes No No No
Cuba (2001) Yes Yes Yes No No No
Brunei (2004) Yes Yes Yes No No No
Syria (2010) No Yes Yes No No No
Renegotiated tax treaties Hong Kong (1998) No No No No No No
Hong Kong (2006) No Yes Yes No No Yes
Singapore (1986) Yes Yes Yes No No No
Singapore (2007) Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Belgium (1985) Yes Yes Yes No No No
Belgium (2009) No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Finland (1986) Yes Yes Yes No No No
Finland (2010) No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Malta (1993) Yes Yes Yes No No No
Malta (2010) No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
United Kingdom (1984) Yes Yes Yes No No No
United Kingdom (2011) No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
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Table 7: List of tax treaties concluded by Hong Kong
Country Year of conclusion
 1. Belgium 2003
 2. Thailand 2005
 3. Vietnam 2008
 4. Brunei 2010
 5. Netherlands 2010
 6. Indonesia 2010
 7. Hungary 2010
 8. Kuwait 2010
 9. Austria 2010
10. United Kingdom 2010
11. Ireland 2010
12. Liechtenstein 2010
13. France 2010
14. Japan 2010
15. Luxembourg 2010
16. New Zealand 2010
17. Switzerland 2010
18. Malta 2011
19. Spain 2011
20. Czech Republic 2011
21. Portugal 2011
22. Malaysia 2012
23. Mexico 2012
Table 8: Source-country taxation of passive income under selected Hong Kong tax treaties
Treaty partner Dividends (%) Interest (%) Royalties (%) UN Model 
Article 
13(4)
UN Model Article 13(5) UN 
Model 
Article 
21(3)
Mainland China 5, 10 7, 0 7 Yes Yes Yes
Austria 0, 10 0 3 Yes No No
Netherlands 0, 10 0 3 Yes No Yes
Liechtenstein 0 0 3 Yes No Yes
Luxembourg 0, 10 0 3 Yes No No
United Kingdom 0, 15 0 3 Yes No No
Japan 5, 10 10 5 No No No
France 10 10, 0 10 Yes Yes Yes
Ireland 0 10, 0 3 Yes No No
